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MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION OPTIMIZATION 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive analysis on how the 
United States Marine Corps conducts contracting and acquisition activities. This report 
further evaluates how those activities, when optimized, can enable the Marine Corps to 
be ready to fight and win within current and future operating environments. This report 
begins by dissecting the status quo through the three pillars of acquisitions and 
contracting. The three pillars are: people, or talent management; processes, the mindset 
with which acquisition decisions are made; and platforms, the vehicles used in that 
acquisition. Through these three pillars, this report examines the status quo and identifies 
its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This study then explores multiple 
optimization alternatives to the status quo, for each of the three pillars, and discusses their 
respective merits and deficiencies. Finally, based on the results of the analysis, this report 
provides comprehensive recommendations that have the potential of optimizing 
operational contracting support and the capabilities the Marine Corps contingency 
contracting force can provide commanders at every level. 
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The United States Marine Corps contracting force is made up of both uniformed 
and civilian contracting professionals. The civilian contracting force is utilized for large 
acquisitions and to provide an enduring presence in installation support. The Marine Corps 
currently uses its uniformed contracting force to provide contracting support forward in 
support of the range of military operations. This mindset is tactically focused and 
considerably under appreciates the full potential of what contracting can do for the Marine 
Corps.  
A. IMPORTANCE OF INNOVATION 
This year, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) James Mattis wrote an unclassified 
National Defense Strategy, which identifies innovation as a defense-wide strategy. In the 
strategy, he specifically directs leaders across the department of defense (DoD) to take a 
critical look at themselves and adapt in a way that best supports the Joint Force and ensures 
maximum lethality and performance: 
Organize for innovation. The Department’s management structure and 
processes are not written in stone, they are a means to an end–empowering 
the warfighter with the knowledge, equipment and support systems to fight 
and win. Department leaders will adapt their organizational structures to 
best support the Joint Force. If current structures hinder substantial 
increases in lethality or performance, it is expected that Service Secretaries 
and Agency heads will consolidate, eliminate, or restructure as needed. The 
Department’s leadership is committed to changes in authorities, granting of 
waivers. (Mattis, 2018, p. 10) 
This excerpt helps illustrate the SecDef directing DoD leadership to create an environment 
that fosters innovation. In response to this directive, the Marine Corps is encouraged to 
create additional avenues for Marines to reach back with their outside-the-box ideas. One 
example is the Marine Corps Installation and Logistics (I&L) Command’s quarterly 
innovation challenges which reach out to all ranks for disruptive ideas that can change how 
the Marine Corps conducts business. The ideas are only the first step. In order to reap the 
benefits of viable ideas, the processes must be responsive and capable of adapting rapidly.  
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B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The Marine Corps’ tactical focus obstructs its ability to recognize the opportunity 
that exists in a more operationally focused integration of contracting capabilities which 
would better empower the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The inability of top 
leaders to understand what contracting can holistically offer at the operational level has 
contributed to a systemic issue in which Marine Corps contracting capabilities have 
remained stagnant over the years. Even though the current contracting methods have met 
mission requirements on a reasonably consistent basis for the past two major conflicts, one 
cannot expect the next battle to be within a similar environment. Top leaders in the DoD 
have emphasized the need for innovation and the adoption of new practices to stay relevant 
in the future fights to come.  
A primary lesson a newly commissioned Marine officer learns is that the enemy 
gets a vote. One of the Marine Corps’ most renown doctrinal publications, Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication 1, describes this sentiment as the following:  
War is thus a process of continuous mutual adaption, of give and take, move 
and countermove. It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an 
inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and animate force 
with its own objectives and plans. While we try to impose our will on the 
enemy, he resists us and seeks to impose his own will on us. (Department 
of the Navy, 1997, p. 3–4) 
This recognizes that any approach to a given problem must account for the intrinsic forces 
that seek to oppose them. In addition, the rhetoric throughout the National Defense Strategy 
for 2018 acknowledges that the United States military is no longer guaranteed a 
competitive advantage against future adversaries. Not only will the equipment set and the 
implementation therein change, but also the way in which the Marine Corps critically 
thinks about challenges it will have to face. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General 
Neller, acknowledges the challenge in the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) by 
stating:  
The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, and equipped to meet 
the demands of the future operating environment characterized by complex 
terrain, technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and 
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exploit signatures, and an increasing non-permissive maritime domain. 
(Neller, 2016, p.12). 
In the MOC, General Neller is calling Marines to action to find methods to overcome the 
organizational challenge currently before the Marine Corps. The MOC also contains a list 
of items on which its success is contingent. Two of those requirements are the extent to 
which the Marine Corps has: 
Redesigned our logistics to support distributable forces across a dynamic 
and fully contested battlespace – because iron mountains of supply and 
lakes of liquid fuel are liabilities and not supportive of maneuver warfare.  
Overcome the enduring obstacles to leveraging and sustaining 
“commercial-off-the-shelf systems” – because affordable “70%” solutions 
now are better than outdated solutions 10 years from now. (Neller, 2016, p. 
13) 
Modifications to contracting could provide viable answers to those two concerns. In order 
for the Marine Corps to be more effective and efficient in the battles to come, its leaders 
need to consider and be open to the idea of adopting new ways to employ its contracting 
capabilities.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our report addresses the following questions: 
Q1. Is the current Marine Corps Contracting Force structured to holistically 
support not only today’s needs but prepare the warfighter to face future 
potential conflicts? 
Q2. Is there a better method to recruit, employ, and utilize the Contingency 
Contracting Force, thus improving the operational value as a resource to the 
Marine Logistics Group (MLG)/ Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)/ 
United States Marine Corps (USMC)?  
Q3. Would the professionalization of the contracting force enhance the lethal 
capabilities of the Marine Corps? 
 
4 
Q4. Can the Marine Corps benefit from integrating a more diverse approach to 
contracting?  
D. SCOPE 
For the past 25 years, there have been multiple theses and projects written about 
the field of contracting within the Marine Corps. The first of these to attempt to address 
the concept of contracting in the Marine Corps was written by, then, United States Marine 
Corps Captain Eric M. Corcoran in 2000. Many other theses were written after 2000 which 
address specific aspects of the Contingency Contracting Force (CCF), from phase zero 
operations and contingency contracting in a deployed environment, to best methods and 
practices to professionalize the CCF. However, since Captain Corcoran’s thesis, there has 
not been another thesis which takes a comprehensive approach to evaluate the CCF. Since 
2000, CCF has supported several operations, to include Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). For these reasons, this report will take lessons 
learned over the last two decades of CCF operations; specifically, this report will cover in 
depth the past, present, and future potential of Marine Corps contracting operations.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
First and foremost, for the purposes of this report, it is critical to understand and 
differentiate between strategic in terms of levels of warfare, and strategic in terms of 
strategic thinking and management. Within the Marine Corps, the word strategic is most 
commonly associated with levels of warfare and joint planning efforts between the 
services. Although the Marine Corps conducts operations which supports strategic 
objectives, the Marine Corps does not operate at a strategic level of war; they operate at 
the tactical and operational levels of warfare. In contrast to that, this report will use the 
word strategic in reference to strategic management, or the way of thinking that deliberates 
decisions made in a rational and logical state of mind for long-term goals. In the conclusion 
of the MOC, General Neller calls upon Marines at every level to action by stating:  
The MOC is a start-point for change, not the end-point. It does not provide 
an answer to every problem. It is intended to generate professional debate 
and discussion about our future challenges. If we are to produce the force 
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we need, it is essential that all Marines and Sailors read, understand and 
discuss the ideas in the MOC. I also ask that all of our partners and 
supporting organizations review the concept and its critical tasks to develop 
an appreciation for our future course and determine how they can improve 
their relationships with the Marine Corps. Working collaboratively 
together, we can refine our understanding of the challenges and the 
opportunities before us. We can develop a practical plan of attack to identify 
and realize solutions, and ensure the Marine Corps of the future is prepared 
to advance to contact, fight, and win where and when our Nation requires. 
Your proactive involvement in validating our operating concept is critical 
to ensuring we can Innovate, Adapt, and Win! I challenge all of you to help 
build the future force that will prove its mettle once again in combat and 
contribute to our legacy of victory. (Neller, 2016, p. 31) 
Achievement of the objectives and goals outlined in the MOC requires strategic 
management at the organizational level, and the Marine Corps needs to think critically 
about where it is today and how it will take measurable steps to get to where it needs to be.  
This report will discuss Marine Corps’ acquisition and procurement optimization 
using a three-tiered approach. The three-tiered model includes looking at Marine Corps 
contracting operations through the lenses of people, processes, and platforms. The first 
pillar, people, will go into the talent management aspect of the CCF by offering three 
distinct courses of action (COA) the Marine Corps could adopt to improve the performance 
of their commissioned uniformed contracting officers (KOs). The second pillar, processes, 
will go into the mindset with which the Marine Corps acquires technology, goods, or 
services. Lastly, the third pillar, platforms, address the specific vehicles the CCF utilizes 
to acquire new technologies, goods, or services. Due to the unnecessary complexities of 
monetizing the intangibles with relation to this topic, this report will instead utilize a 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis to dissect the problem 
statement further. This SWOT will allow for a business model to assist in the production a 
more optimized structure that aligns with key strategic goals as laid out by the SecDef and 
the commandant of the Marine Corps. Through the three lenses, this report seeks to offer 
an understanding of how deviations, some simple and some complex, from the status quo 
can significantly augment capabilities and further optimize the lethality and performance 
of the Marine Corps contracting force. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The comprehensive approach of this report will span five chapters which will cover 
the following areas: 
Chapter I is the introduction which presents the questions this report seeks to 
answer. 
Chapter II provides a comprehensive background understanding of the history 
associated with the current Marine contracting structure as it relates to people, processes, 
and platforms. 
Chapter III states the status quo and provides a thorough SWOT analysis of the 
current Marine contracting structure as it relates to people, processes, and platforms. 
Chapter IV provides recommendations for opportunities the Marine Corps could 
pursue which would optimize contracting performance and support to the MAGTF. 
Chapter V makes recommendations of what an optimal contracting structure could 






II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Marine Corps contracting efforts have seen a number of theses written over the past 
15 years. Many of the issues that were identified at the time of their publication still 
resonate in the Marine Corps and have not been addressed for a multitude of reasons. This 
section will conduct a review of some of the past works that have not only assisted the 
research team in better understanding the topic but stemmed critical thinking in which the 
authors attempt to discuss further. The reason this report is possible is due to the extensive 
research conducted and written by others and by both the faculty and students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). 
A prevalent document which assisted the authors to shape their mindset in 
preparation for this report was The Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) for Optimal Planning 
and Execution of Contingency Contracting by Elliot Cory Yoder, 2004. Yoder describes a 
Three-Tiered Model approach to combating complex contracting problems in a military 
setting, with the three tiers consisting of (1) training and education, (2) certification, and 
(3) experience (Yoder, 2004). More than seven years later, a report published in 2012 
readdresses the same points identified by YTTM, but with a more strategic lens. The newer 
report, called Phase Zero Contracting Operations – Strategic and Integrative Planning for 
Contingency and Expeditionary Operations by E. Cory Yoder, William E. Long, Jr., and 
Dayne E. Nix, 2012, discusses how each of the three theirs associated with the YTTM can 
optimize and better prepare the DoD for future contingencies. The first tier of the YTTM 
describes contracting efforts by junior military staff conducting simple transactions at 
tactical and unit levels. The second tier can conduct operations at the tactical level but 
introduces the operational level as well. This tier consists of mid-grade officers and begins 
to integrate the planning efforts into the higher levels of command; contracting efforts that 
are above the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) and consist of more complex 
negotiations. The third tier is senior officials, usually flag-level or equivalent, and 
introduces the strategic nature of contracting into the DoD. They are entrusted in ensuring 
that the Annex W, the contracting annex, will support the overarching concept of 
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operations. The three tiers complement each other to improve the lethality of the operating 
forces, balancing the three levels of warfare concerning contracting efforts (Yoder, Long, 
Nix, 2012). 
As identified in Chapter I, the importance of innovative ideas, and the 
implementation thereof enable the DoD to be more equipped when a new contingency 
arises. In Yoder, Long, and Nix’s report, the authors conclude that “contracting has not 
been fully integrated into military planning and execution,” as well as “the lack of planning 
and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to loss of efficiencies, lack of 
effectiveness, and in many cases, outright fraud” (Yoder et al., 2012, p. 33). These issues 
that were identified in 2012 are still persistent in 2018, and numerous theses were written 
researching these, among similar, issues. 
1.  Acquisition Workforce Management 
a. Title 10, Chapter 87, Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Chapter 87 of Title 10 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) covers matters concerning 
the defense acquisition workforce, civilian or uniformed. Specific to the purview of this 
thesis are two sections within this chapter; § 1721 and § 1722a. § 1721 establishes the 
requirement for the DoD to designate positions as being an acquisition position, or not, to 
indicate who is beholden to the requirements set forth by Title 10, U.S.C., Chapter 87. The 
section specifically says: 
(a) Designation.—The Secretary of Defense shall designate in 
regulations those positions in the Department of Defense that are 
acquisition positions for purposes of this chapter.  
(b) Required Positions.—In designating the positions under subsection 
(a), the Secretary shall include, at a minimum, all acquisition-related 
positions in the following areas: 
(1) Program management. 
(2) Systems planning, research, development, engineering, and 
testing. 
(3) Procurement, including contracting. 
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(4) Industrial property management. 
(5) Logistics. 
(6) Quality control and assurance. 
(7) Manufacturing and production. 
(8) Business, cost estimating, financial management, and 
auditing. 
(9) Education, training, and career development. 
(10) Construction. 
(11) Joint development and production with other government 
agencies and foreign countries. 
(12) Intellectual property. (Designation of Acquisition Positions, 
2018) 
Once acquisition positions are determined, §1722a, subsection (a) directs the SecDef to, 
“establish policies and issue guidance to ensure the proper development, assignment, and 
employment of members of the armed forces in the acquisition field to achieve the 
objectives of this subsection as specified in section (b)” (Special requirements for military 
personnel in the acquisition field, 2018). Subsection (b) then goes on to say: 
Objectives.—Policies established and guidance issued pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall ensure, at a minimum, the following: 
(1) A single-track career path in the acquisition field that attracts the highest 
quality officers and enlisted personnel. 
(2) A dual-track career path that attracts the highest quality officers and 
enlisted personnel and allows them to gain experience in and receive credit 
for a primary career in combat arms and a functional secondary career in 
the acquisition field in order to more closely align the military operational, 
requirements, and acquisition workforces of each armed force. 
(3) A number of command positions and senior noncommissioned officer 
positions, including acquisition billets reserved for general officers and flag 
officers under subsection (c), sufficient to ensure that members of the armed 




(4) A number of qualified, trained members of the armed forces eligible for 
and active in the acquisition field sufficient to ensure the optimum 
management of the acquisition functions of the Department of Defense and 
the appropriate use of military personnel in contingency contracting. 
(Special requirements for military personnel in the acquisition field, 2018)  
These are only small portions of the entire requirements levied on the DoD by Title 10, 
U.S.C., Chapter 87.  
b. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.66 and Desk Guide 
DoD Instruction (DODI) 5000.66, Defense Acquisition Workforce Education, 
Training, Experience, and Career Development Program, is the latest instruction for the 
implementation of Title 10, U.S.C., Chapter 87. Beyond implementation guidance, DODI 
500.66, “Establishes policies, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for the 
conduct of the Defense Acquisition Workforce (AWF) Education, Training, Experience, 
and Career Development Program, referred to in this issuance as the “AWF Program” 
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2018, p. 1). Section 5 of DODI 5000.66 addresses 
positions which at a minimum will be coded as part of the AWF, of which contracting, 
uniformed or civilian, is one of them. The instruction not only acknowledges contracting 
as part of the AWF, but it goes on to make a distinction in that contracting positions have 
unique requirements. The requirements leveraged on contracting officers are above those 
leveraged on all other AWF positions. Furthermore, DODI 5000.66 makes the distinction 
between the AWF and the defense acquisition corps (DAC). Chapter 87, Title 10, U.S.C., 
directs each military department to properly identify positions that are part of the AWF, 
but it also has a separate requirement for each military department to have a DAC. AWF 
members are not automatically a member of the DAC. As per the instruction, the DAC is,  
A pool of highly-qualified members of the AWF from which KLPs and 
CAPs are filled. It is comprised of those persons who have met the standards 
prescribed by Chapter 87 of Title 10, U.S.C., and this issuance, and to whom 
the USD(AT&L) or a CAE has granted admission to the Acquisition Corps. 
(DoD, 2018, p. 33)  
As members of the AWF, contracting officers are eligible to compete for acceptance into 
the DAC (DoD, 2018).  
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In addition to the DODI 5000.66, the Department also published a complimentary 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Program Desk Guide. The stated purpose of the desk guide 
is to provide, “detailed procedures for implementing policy established in Department of 
Defense (DoDI) 5000.66. If there is a conflict with the DoDI 5000.66, the Instruction takes 
precedence.” (Department of Defense [DoD], 2017a, p. 2). Section 1 of the desk guide 
reiterates the importance of coding AWF positions as directed by Chapter 87 of Title 10, 
U.S.C. This section also lists the 15 career fields within which every AWF position must 
be assigned. One of those 15 career fields is contracting (DoD, 2017a).  
2. Eric M. Corcoran, 2000 Naval Postgraduate Master’s Thesis
In his thesis, then Captain Eric M. Corcoran researched the development of a 
permanent contracting command structure. To inform his analysis of the CCF at the time, 
Captain Corcoran conducted interviews with active duty KOs, personnel in leadership 
positions within the Marine Corps’ contracting structure, and Marine Corps legal officers. 
One revelation Captain Corcoran made was that “The procurement policies and procedures 
are cumbersome while the structure of the personnel force is disjointed and unstable” 
(Corcoran, 2000, p. 43). Aside from the fact, there was only 16 KOs at the time, now there 
is about double, and that the contracting organization names were different at the time 
Captain Corcoran wrote his thesis, many things remain the same. There is no standard 
operating procedure by which contracting organizations conduct business. Each 
organization and each location pursues contracting activities slightly different (Corcoran, 
2000). 
In his interviews with active duty KOs, Captain Corcoran identified a problem in 
KO retention and concluded that all KOs believed the transition to KO should be permanent 
because contracting is a technically challenging and detail oriented profession which 
required constant utilization for proficiency and currency. At the time KOs were also 
educated through NPS. However, participants were selected by application and were not 
limited to only 3002 supply officers. All interviewed officers identified that their NPS 
education, while outstanding, was theoretical and did not prepare them for the realities of 
how the Marine Corps executes contracting activities. More than half of those interviewed 
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identified that background in a combat service support (CSS) facilitated a better 
understanding of the close relationship between contracting and CSS activities. Although 
interviewees acknowledged that a CSS background was not necessary, officers who held 
CSS background had a more gradual learning curve as compared to their combat arms 
counterparts. All interviewees unanimously had an appreciation for their fleet marine force 
(FMF) experience prior to transitioning to the KO field in that it enabled them to get to 
know their customer and develop the ability to communicate with them effectively. High-
level officers interviewed called the FMF experience a must in that it helped KOs 
understand mission needs and customer support (Corcoran, 2000).  
Through his research and the situational awareness, it developed, Captain Corcoran 
identified a command structure which would facilitate a permanent lateral transfer. He also 
identified the two primary hurdles such a change would have to overcome. First, 
contracting would need the buy-in of senior leaders. Second, in order to extend the 
contracting field, leaders will have to fight for billets in a table of organization (T/O). 
Congress sets total manpower authorized numbers, and as a result, the Marine Corps cannot 
add more billets in one community without taking them from somewhere else. Some of the 
additional billets would enable the contracting community to have a roadmap to 
advancement and promotion without requiring officers to leave the field for prerequisite 
billets in their primary military occupational specialty (PMOS). (Corcoran, 2000).  
3. Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, 2007
The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, more commonly referred to as the Gansler Commission, was established by 
the Secretary of the Army to produce lessons learned from contracting operations in OEF 
and OIF. The intent was for the commission to conduct an analysis of the Army’s 
operations in-theater and make recommendations to help future Army operations be more 
effective, efficient, and transparent. Ultimately, in their report, Urgent Reform Required: 
Army Expeditionary Contracting, the commission identified five critical deficiencies. First, 
the Army did not have enough Army contracting officers or non-commissioned officers 
(NCO). Second, the Army did not have an acquisition workforce that was, “staffed, trained, 
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structured, or empowered” to meet the needs of a deployed Warfighter (Department of the 
Army [Army], 2007, p. 2). Third, the commission identified a seven-fold increase in 
workload and an increase in contracting complexity without the growth of the workforce 
or additional training. Fourth, the Army has not recognized how the increase in contractors 
in expeditionary environments impacts mission success. Lastly, the Army is not 
treating contracting like a core competency (Army, 2007).  
From their root cause analysis, the commission identified four key improvements 
the Army should pursue if it wanted to be more effective and efficient in future 
expeditionary operations, as well as, reduce fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition to 
identifying deficiencies, the Gansler report made four overarching recommendations to the 
Army: 
1. Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military
and civilian contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary
operations).
2. Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate
contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS
operations.
3. Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in
expeditionary operations.
4. Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable
contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations. (Army, 2007,
p. 5)
Even though the commission’s report was solely based on an analysis of the Army’s 
contracting operations within an expeditionary environment, Section 849 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, required the entire DoD to 
evaluate the recommendations made in the Gansler report (United States House of 
Representatives, 2007).  
4. Adam Harrison, 2016 Naval Postgraduate Master’s Thesis
In Adam Harrison, Craig Warner, and Dylan Armknecht thesis from 2016 
researched the nature of the transitory assignments of officers and the correlation to the 
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inability to efficiently execute mission requirements within the Marine Corps. During the 
research, the thesis group conducted a survey, which included senior enlisted and field 
grade officers who were currently serving in contracting billets at the time the thesis was 
written. In the conduct of their research the thesis group submitted a survey in which the 
following questions pertain to this thesis: 
Question 2: Does your command have a reintegration period for 
commissioned officer returning to the contracting MOS for a subsequent 
tour before they are able to deploy? If yes, what training is required? 
(Harrison, Warner, and Armknecht, 2016, p. 27) 
Question 6: Which of the following are documented as critical 
vulnerabilities that affect the mission readiness for contracting? (Harrison 
et al., 2016, p. 30) 
Question 7: What incentives (if any) could be offered to support retention 
of commissioned officers in the contracting community? (Harrison et al., 
2016, p. 31) 
Of the personnel that responded to question 2 of their survey, 100 percent replied “no.” 
With the ever-changing policies and highly regulated environment which surround 
contracting, survey respondents agreed that returning KOs should receive additional 
training once they return to CCF. Furthermore, the group identified that Marine officers 
returning to their PMOS have minimal incentives to retain the knowledge and experience 
gained during their utilization tour. (Harrison et al., 2016). 
The surveyed Marines identified that officer manpower shortfall were the highest 
risk to the Marine Corps impact on contingency contracting readiness. The second highest 
was the officer technical proficiency in the military occupational specialty (MOS). 
Furthermore, survey members provided additional comments of other critical 
vulnerabilities such as lack of a limited duty officer (LDO) or warrant officer (WO) option, 
lack of contracting training, and not permanently assigning 3006 operational contract 
support (OCS) officer as a PMOS. Table 1 is from Harrison, Warner, and Armknecht’s 
thesis and it is a tabulated representation of the responses they received to question 6 of 
their survey. (Harrison et al., 2016). 
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Table 1. Critical Vulnerabilities to Contracting Mission Readiness. 
Adapted from Harrison, Warner, and Armknecht (2016). 
The top retention method was to provide a DoD-funded graduate degree program. 
Beginning with the 2014 Commandant’s Professional Intermediate-Level Board (CPIB) 
and the Commandant’s Career Level Education Board (CCLEB) results, Marine officers 
have been selected to attend NPS in order to the gain the knowledge required to receive the 
additional MOS of 3006 OCS officers. The highest no response was to take no actions to 
incentives retention within 3006 OCS officer community, much of the concerns revolve 
around the issue of competitiveness for promotions thus reducing the likelihood of 
returning to CCF. Table 2 is from Harrison, Warner, and Armknecht’s thesis and it is a 
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tabulated representation of the responses they received to question 7 of their survey. 
(Harrison et al., 2016). 
Table 2. Survey Responses to Incentivizing KO Retention. Adapted from 
Harrison, Warner, and Armknecht (2016) 
 
 
5. Lee A. White, 2017 Naval Postgraduate Master’s Thesis 
In his thesis, Mr. Lee A. White conducted a cost-benefit analysis of three COAs the 
Marine Corps does and could pursue to train and educate unrestricted commissioned KOs. 
In his analysis, Mr. White measured the cost of education and the time, in months, that it 
would take for a Marine officer to complete their education and utilization tour. This 
analysis considered several factors based on 2016 cost and pay data to calculate a low, 
typical, and high cost for each COA. (White, 2017). 
In COA 1, a Marine officer would be educated through the NPS distance-learning 
program (DLP). Their utilization tour clock would start immediately, and they would 
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simultaneously be expected to complete the DLP program and their distance professional 
military education (PME) in grade. According, to Mr. White’s analysis this COA would 
take 36 months to complete. The cost estimates range from a low of $215,512 to a high of 
$261,203 per student. (White, 2017). 
COA 2 consisted of the current approach to education KOs by having them attend 
NPS. In the current approach, officers must complete their respective grade distance PME 
before graduation, and their utilization tour begins immediately after graduation. This 
approach is estimated to take 54 months to complete. The estimated cost ranges from a low 
of $195,990 to a high of $233,390 per student. (White, 2017). 
In COA 3, Mr. White looked at an approach the Marine Corps does not currently 
utilize. Mr. White looked at what it would cost to have unrestricted commissioned officers 
attend night school online or at a local institution instead of attending resident or distance 
NPS. This COA requires that an officer in the program attend a four-month Contingency 
Contracting Office Course (CCOC), which does not currently exist, to get their Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) education as the first step. After 
finishing CCOC, an officer would go to their utilization tour location and simultaneously 
complete their distance PME and a masters of business administration (MBA) using the 
military tuition assistance program. This approach is estimated to take up to 40 months to 
complete. The estimated cost ranges from a low of $82,046 to a high of $104,034 per 
student (White, 2017). 
6. Other Works
Although more works assisted in shaping how this report would be conducted, the 
mindsets came from the authors own perspective. This report will utilize a three-tiered 
approach, personnel, processes, and platforms, to address optimization which is similar to 
pillars found in Yoder, Long, Nix’s Phase Zero Contracting Operations called Yoder’s 
Three Integrated Pillars of Success (YTIPS). The three pillars under the YTIPS model are 
personnel, implementing the YTTM, platforms, incorporating all phases of the military 
operations with contracting, and protocols, procedures, and rules that are incorporated into 
the planning and execution of the contracting plan (Yoder et al., 2012). This report will 
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discuss personnel within a similar aspect, concerning talent management; but differ on the 
other two. The YTIPS model is written at a more strategic level, in which it uses joint 
publications as reference documents and actual contracting systems when discussing 
platforms and protocols. This report intends to discuss processes and platforms internal to 
the Marine Corps.  
B. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter reviewed previous works that were read and referenced to 
assist this report’s authors in the creation of the MBA project. Further discussion into the 
status quo of the Marine Corps contracting force is broken down by personnel, processes, 
and platforms and will be in Chapter III, followed by alternatives in Chapter IV. The works 
cited in this chapter assisted in creating the SWOT analysis in Chapter III and the 
alternatives discussed in Chapter IV.  
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III. STATUS QUO 
This chapter describes the status quo as it relates to the people, processes, and 
platforms which support contracting activities in the Marine Corps. These descriptions will 
include a brief analysis of each section, followed then by a SWOT analysis. Since the 
Marine Corps reserves the right not to implement recommended changes, the authors 
decided to label the Status Quo as COA 1. 
A. PEOPLE 
This section will provide a description and analysis of how the Marine Corps 
currently conducts talent management of 3006 OCS officers.  
1. Analysis 
Since 2014, Marine Corps policy has been that only officers holding the 3002 
supply officer PMOS are eligible for selection through either the CPIB or CCLEB to attend 
the 815 Acquisition & Contract Management curriculum at the NPS. Those officers 
selected thorough CPIB or CCLEB receive permanent change of station orders to attend 
NPS in Monterey, California the summer after the Marine administrative (MARADMIN) 
message is released announcing their selection. The 815 curriculum at NPS is an 18-month 
program which provides graduates with an MBA with a focus on acquisition and 
contracting. Graduates of the curriculum 815 depart NPS with the education necessary to 
achieve DAWIA Level I, II, and III certification upon meeting the experience requirements 
for each level.  
In addition to a diverse knowledge base, Marine Corps officers in the 815 
curriculum receive the necessary MOS (NMOS) of 3006 OCS officers. Current manpower 
structure aligns 3006 OCS officers under manpower management officer assignment 
(MMOA) 1 / monitored assignment codes 18 for assignment based on the Marine Corps’ 
needs and with inputs from the OCS officer occupational field sponsor.  
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Based on the needs of the Marine Corps, a 3006 OCS officers on their first, or 
follow-on, contracting tour will be assigned primarily to three key billets in the Marine 
Corps.  
1. MEF command elements: These billets are typically staffed by a field 
grade officers within G-4 as an OCS advisor to assist in the planning, 
coordinating, validating, and synchronizing of contingency contracting 
requirements for MAGTF operations.  
2. Expeditionary Contracting Platoon (ECP): Each MLG has an ECP section 
under its Headquarters Regiment. They provide limited simplified 
acquisition procedures (SAP) contracting support to deployed units, and 
contingency operations support forward across a range of operation.  
3. Regional Contracting Office (RCO): There are regional commands with 
multiple offices that support preparing the Marine Corps to fight 
contingency operations abroad. Each RCO maintains their mission 
statement, but they all provide general contracting and procurement 
support to their respective regions as well as a professional training and 
mentoring environment to create forward-thinking expeditionary officers. 
All 3006 OCS officers will spend a year of on-the-job training at an RCO 
office to gain experience and mentorship with KOs and civilian 
contracting officers. 
Figure 1 depicts what the progression of an officer through the current talent 
management model could look like. This model assumes that an officer has no prior 
enlisted service and is selected to the 815 curriculum program after completing one tour as 




Figure 1. Sample Officer Progression through COA 1 
a. Strengths 
The most resounding strength of the current talent management approach the 
Marine Corps uses for officers in the CCF is that it is established and it is integrated into 
how the Marine Corps executes contingency operations today. Although the officer 
component of the CCF is relatively small, it has continued to find success in accomplishing 
the mission. The entire CCF officer core stabilizes around 30 officers at any given point, 
but there are more that have achieved the 3006 OCS officer MOS in the fleet conducting a 
tour within their PMOS. If a critical requirement for OCS officers arises, the Marine Corps 




A significant weakness in the current talent management process is the proficiency 
loss during the rotation of KOs between a KO tour and a PMOS tour. Unlike many other 
MOS fields, contracting and acquisitions are in a constant state of evolving and changing 
regulations, statutes, and directives. The removal of KOs for one or two tours outside of 
the contracting realm is extremely detrimental to a set of perishable contracting skills. 
Since government contracting regulations continually evolve due to variations in policies, 
changes in key leadership positions, and improvements in the processes; staying abreast of 
all changes, and the ramifications thereof, is pertinent to the professional nature of the CCF.  
The majority of the officers selected for the 815 curriculum under CPIB or CCLEB, 
in the last three FYs, were prior enlisted with an average of 10–15 years of service. This 
alludes that the board selects those who are more senior in their career progression rather 
than selecting more junior officers who will have the potential to execute multiple 
utilization tours. The potential for additional utilization tours is one of the distinctions 
between Marines who attend the 815 curriculum at NPS versus other NPS programs. Most 
of the other programs Marines graduate from through NPS require only one payback tour, 
but those selected for the 815 curriculum can conduct multiple utilization tours throughout 
their career. Even though all master’s degree from NPS are the same, the Marine Corps 
requires a more educated pool of officers to manage the RCO and ECP units. Furthermore, 
in his thesis, Mr. White determined the cost to educate a KO through NPS to range from a 
low of $195,990 to a high of $233,390 per student. With only one utilization tour for most 
programs, the Marine Corps views the return on investment (ROI) has justified the cost of 
the education. However, due to the unique circumstances surrounding KOs, the 815 NPS 
graduates in the Marine Corps conduct follow-on tours within the 3006 OCS officer MOS. 
This provides an opportunity for the Marine Corps to expand the ROI being received from 
this community so long as it is planned correctly. One of the first issues which affects the 
number of follow-on tours is the fact that based on the FY16 through FY18 CPIB and 
CCLEB selection results for the 815 curriculum, the Marine Corps is consistently selecting 
prior enlisted officers with an average of 10–15 years of service. Table 3 showcases the 
FY16 through FY18 CPIB and CCLEB selections based on rank when selected, time in 
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service (TIS) each selectee will have upon graduating from NPS, and the average TIS of 
each class. 
Table 3. USMC FY16-18 NPS 815 Curriculum Selection Data 
 
* Denotes prior enlisted service 
 
The Marine Corps’ selection for the CPIB or CCLEB, is based on future anticipated 
gaps. The selection quantity for the 815 curriculum has been based-on which officers will 
depart the MOS to return to their PMOS for a key billet tour or retire. Based on the CPIB 
and CCLEB slating results, six Captains and two Lieutenants were selected for FY16, two 
Captains and four Lieutenants were selected for FY17, and two Captains and six 
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Lieutenants were selected for FY18. Even though the number of officers selected for the 
3006 OCS officer MOS has been steadily increasing, it is a reflection of those leaving the 
MOS as well. The current model does not grow the 3006 OCS officer community to meet 
T/O requirements or match operational staffing demands. 
c. Opportunities 
One of the key opportunities the Marine Corps can exploit is the training officers 
receive at NPS. NPS’s academic catalog states the Acquisition & Contract Management 
Curriculum as: 
The Acquisition and Contract Management curriculum is an 
interdisciplinary program which integrates management theory, accounting, 
economics, finance, behavioral science, management theory, operations/
systems analysis, and specific courses in acquisition and contracting. The 
815 curriculum includes a concentration option in strategic purchasing. 
Student input includes officers and civilians from all DoD services, other 
federal agencies, and allied nations. The curriculum is designed to provide 
officers and civilians with the skills to serve effectively in systems buying 
offices, field contracting offices, contract administration offices, and 
contracting policy offices. (Naval Postgraduate School, 2018, p. 53) 
In addition to the skills learned during the NPS 815 curriculum, graduates receive 
DAWIA level 3 education. The Marine Corps can potentially utilize these highly trained 
officers more effectively by augmenting the level of responsibility it gives to the KOs with 
higher threshold levels than the SAT. Commissioned officers already receive a special trust 
and confidence by the President of the United States, when compared to their non-
commissioned and civilian counterparts. This higher degree of responsibility can be 
enacted upon when delegating rights and roles of the KOs within the Marine Corps, in 
accordance with their commissioning warrant. This will provide a higher level of 
experience and knowledge in the contracting field. 
Due to the level of training and education that officers received, there are other 
opportunities to use these highly trained professionals in other aspects of contracting. Other 
opportunities to conduct tours at other DoD agencies would assist in broadening the 
experience of these officers, which would increase the lethality of force and breadth of 
knowledge. These experience broadening billets would be at placed at locations such as 
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Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Contracting Audit Agency, 
and Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) which would be in line with the other DoD services. 
These outside billets would better enable the KOs to incorporate the use of non-Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) based contractual agreements, which would also give the 
Marine Corps more flexibility.  
d. Threats 
There are two significant threats to the current model: retention and mission 
accomplishment. With the first threat, retention is composed of internal and external 
factors. Internally, the contracting community has to contend with officers who want to 
return to their PMOS for advancement and command opportunities. Additionally, the trend 
of over half of those selected being later in their career places many in a position where 
they can retire after their utilization tour is over. Externally, there is a high demand for 
contracting experience in the private sector. This presents a highly lucrative opportunity 
for officers, which may influence their decision to leave active duty for a second career in 
the private sector. 
The second threat of the current process is how it may potentially affect the ability 
of the CCF to meet future warfighter requirements in a timely fashion. In their thesis, 
Harrison, Warner, and Armknecht surveyed then active duty KOs and identified manpower 
shortfalls as the most significant critical vulnerability (CV) to the Marine Corps’ ability to 
efficiently execute mission requirements. The first CV identified was manpower shortfalls, 
not in T/O quantity, but vacancies. Manpower deficiencies have not only resulted in the 
occasional assignment of Captains and Major to fill billets intended for one or two ranks 
higher, but on a few occasions, Lieutenant Colonels have been assigned to billet intended 
for a Majors. These practices contribute to the second CV vulnerability identified in their 
thesis which was a lack of KO technical proficiency. The combination of these two critical 
vulnerabilities threatens the enduring ability to support the warfighter most optimally.  
2. Conclusion 
This section provides the current status for selecting, educating, assigning and 
retaining KOs within the contingency contracting force. The Marine Corps invests 
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significant amounts of funds and resources to educate, train, and field its 3006 OCS officers 
and this segment highlights and provides a SWOT analysis to showcase the benefits or 
vulnerabilities of maintaining the current status quo. This next section will address the 
processes in which the Marine Corps procures services and goods.  
B. PROCESSES 
This section will address the current acquisition mindset with which the Marine 
Corps acquires technology, goods, or services.  
1. Analysis 
At the tactical level, the warfighter requests services or goods through its using unit 
supply section. Based on the dollar threshold amount, the organic supply section can 
procure services and supplies within its capabilities; however, if the amount surpasses a 
certain dollar threshold, the RCO will then contract out the service or procure the supply 
for the warfighter. Deploying units will have the support of both its organic supply section 
and an ECP KO for contingency contracting capabilities.  
a. Strengths 
Each contracting office has established standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
ensuring that policies and procedures are performed in a uniformed way ensuring that 
services and supplies are procured promptly. This ensures the format or layout of the 
contract that is awarded in a particular office is indistinguishable between different 
personnel, and this will reduce rework and minimize the manpower hours to focus on other 
tasks at hand.  
b. Weaknesses 
The Marine Corps heavily relies on a civilian contracting force for day-to-day 
operations and to conduct big “A” acquisition for new and old capabilities. This 
arrangement denies uniformed KOs the opportunities to receive the high-level contracting 
experience, which would enable them to provide guidance and recommendations to senior 
military leadership from a service member’s perspective. 
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Since there is no standard SOP throughout the CCF, inspection results could vastly 
differ between each contracting office and reduce shared, community-centric, process 
improvement or best practices adoption across regions. Marine Corps Acquisition Policy 
& Procedures (MAPP) instructs contracting units to conduct an independent annual self-
assessment to inspect each aspect of contracting to ensure that they are following proper 
procedure. MAPP provides very general and broad guidance on how a contracting 
command should self-assess internal contracting processes. Following is the guidance the 
MAPP provides on the annual self-assessment report:  
The annual report should clearly convey the actions the MCFCS office has 
taken to improve the quality of its contracting/procurement operations. At a 
minimum, the MCFCS office’s report must address the following: 
(i) a summary of the self-assessments the MCFCS office has conducted 
during the previous fiscal year (identify dates/results of each 
assessment and explain the methodology that was employed); 
(ii) the MCFCS office’s self-assessment in regard to the current DoN 
Special Interest Items; 
(iii) the MCFCS office’s self-assessment of its Small Business program 
implementation; 
(iv) a summary of the findings noted for the MCFCS office and its 
subordinate offices; 
(v) any statutory and/or regulatory deficiencies identified; 
(vi) any associated corrective actions taken either at the MCFCS office 
level or specific subordinate office level; 
(vii) any best practices which could be useful to other DoN contracting 
activities or MCFCS offices; 
(viii) any other relevant information, i.e., the results of annual warrant file 
audits, acquisition staffing and workload analysis, external audits or 
reviews to include the status of relevant recommendations; and, if 
applicable, 
(ix) any actions taken in response to a DASN(AP) or HQMC I&L 
PPMAP performed during the reporting period.” (Department of the 
Navy, 2017b, appendix M). 
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This kind of vague self-inspection guidance and requirement leave a wide gap for 
interpretation on how contracting policy should be executed and followed.  
c. Opportunities 
Being a smaller force compared to the other services, the Marine Corps has the 
opportunity to adapt more quickly. They quickly established a Marine detachment within 
the DIU organization; this immediately provided a presence and another an avenue to 
leverage other transaction authorities (OTAs). DIU is not the only organization within the 
Marine Corps to use OTAs as Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) as 
well as I&L both have elements that experiment with OTAs. The Marine Corps, as an 
organization, must exploit this opportunity and incorporate the capabilities these 
organizations offer into the operating forces. This will provide an increase in purchasing 
power, reduce unnecessary expenditures, and reallocate funds to other projects. As the 
RCO is already an established structure within the Marine Corps, KOs assigned to an RCO 
can be the representative link between the tactical level and the OTA efforts made by DIU, 
MARCORSYSCOM, and I&L. KOs assigned to an RCO will be the permanent collection 
center for potential OTAs which will create an avenue for innovative ideas to a working 
prototype. 
Additionally, there is limited interaction between uniformed KOs and the using 
units. Requests for contracting support are submitted and often ‘kicked-back’ and get 
rejected or returned for adjustments. The lack of communication between the civilian 
contracting professionals and the requirements generator leads to a toxic environment 
where the customer does not trust the process due to the lack of understanding. There needs 
to be more involvement from the uniformed KOs to be the link between the civilian KOs 
and using unit organizations.  
d. Threats 
The military cannot count on having a competitive advantage in the next fight if the 
Marine Corps continues to rely on its current methods for acquisition. Presently, the Marine 
Corps as an organization is unable to adapt to current environmental changes or innovate 
to tackle future threats. This problem with adoption cannot support the future problems to 
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ensure the warfighters have the superior advantage over its adversaries. The lack of 
contracting knowledge, network managers, and effective processes to enable future 
adoption of technology and services will continue to reduce the performance of contracting 
in austere environments.  
2. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Marine Corps can meet and complete assigned missions with the 
current contingency contracting process in place. However, this does not mean the Marine 
Corps is fully utilizing the capabilities of the contracting force. Not establishing a 
uniformed SOP within CCF has the potential of an increase of fraud, waste, and abuse 
within the acquisition. Due to the technological advantages fostered by the profit-oriented 
businesses, the Marine Corps need to adopt new pathways to incorporate these new 
technologies is apparent. The adaptive nature of the Marine Corps regularly promotes new 
innovative ideas; however, these ideas need an outlet to become prototypes and further the 
Marine Corps competitive advantage. Without looking at the strategy in which the Marine 
Corps acquires these technologies will put the Marine Corps behind the other services, and 
furthermore, behind their potential adversaries.  
C. PLATFORMS  
This section covers the third pillar and will begin by providing an overview of the 
platforms or vehicles the Marine Corps uses to perform acquisition functions. Following 
the overview, an analysis will be conducted using the SWOT approach. The SWOT will 
not be for each platform, but will instead analyze the overall capabilities of the combination 
of the platforms. Due to a lack of an understanding of software among the team writing 
this report, the optimization analysis in Chapter IV will be limited to options the Marine 




1. Marine Corps Procurement Platforms 
a. Procurement Request Builder 
Procurement Request (PR) Builder is an online-based program that is the link 
between the requirements generator, usually the supply officer, and the procurement 
specialist, the KO, for supply or service requests. This system is the first encounter of the 
requirements generator into the contracting process, and the information inputted into the 
PR Builder must describe the detailed work being requested, or a detailed description of 
the needed supplies. Although the system is currently being used to capture data for 
auditability requirements by Headquarters Marine Corps, this report will only touch on the 
contracting aspect of it.  
b. Government Commercial Purchase Card 
The GCPC is a program where purchases under the micro-purchase threshold can 
be made for supplies, services, construction, or training. The GCPC is arguably the most 
streamlined form of commercial acquisition, authorized by Congress, available to the 
government and the Marine Corps. Although the separation of the requirements generator 
and purchaser is still a valid requirement, the certification process to become a GCPC 
cardholder is less stringent and time-consuming than that of becoming a KO. This 
empowers lower levels of the Marine Corps to purchase supplies, services, construction, 
or training under a shorter timeline. Additionally, KOs, due to their training, have the 
potential to be given a higher threshold for utilization of the GCPC and can exceed the 
micro-purchase threshold in coordination with their warrant dictated by FAR 1.606-3. 
c. Wide Area Workflow / Invoicing, Receipt, Acceptance, and Property 
Transfer  
Wide Area Workflow (WAWF), also known as Invoicing, Receipt, Acceptance, 
and Property Transfer (IRAPT), is an online system where vendors and buyers can track 
invoices, and the receipt thereof, which are submitted to the various government agencies. 
Since it is web-based, it leaves a paperless trail for the invoicing, receipt, and acceptance 
in a secure method. Ultimately, this method reduces the time spent on processing the 
invoices by government personnel due to its use of real-time submission timelines.  
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d. Global Combat Support System- Marine Corps  
Global Combat Support System (GCSS), further the Marine Corps variant known as 
GCSS-MC, is a web-based program in which uniformed logisticians conduct a multitude of 
tasks. These tasks range from maintenance, accountability of equipment, ordering repair parts, 
tracking shipped parts, provide data based reports, and other such tasks. From the range of 
tasks that can be accomplished through GCSS-MC, the Marine Corps relies on the contracted 
services of GCSS-MC to be the system in which supply and maintenance would be conducted. 
Although the GCSS-MC processes are mainly used by uniformed logisticians, as well as 
supply and maintenance personnel, this system is used for tactical level movements, and total 
asset visibility, not to include any variation of the contracting processes.  
e. Defense Travel System 
The Defense Travel System (DTS) is the ‘one-and-done’ travel system for all travel 
that utilizes the government travel charge card. Although the funding for travel may come 
from a variety of sources, the method does not change from user to user, or from agency to 
agency, and it remains constant throughout the uniformed services. On this web-based 
application, members can schedule all aspects pertaining to travel, or they work with the 
commercial travel office representative to assist in contracting their travel requirements. This 
dissuades members from personally contracting travel that can be accomplished through the 
DTS system. Through DTS, the government reduces the cost of travel by contracting a 
preferred commercial carrier, removing change fees, and getting reduced cost flights for last 
minute travel.  
2. Analysis 
a. Strengths 
The mission of the Marine Corps is being accomplished through the current platforms. 
Through these systems, there are necessary redundancies that allow the Marine Corps to 
maintain its internal controls that it has enacted on each one of the systems without being 
overly taxing to the personnel that utilizes these systems. The multitude of systems have been 
in use for numerous years and are familiar to the personnel that interacts with these systems 
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day to day. The delegation of these systems is at the lowest level at a battalion or the individual 
Marine level. This decentralizes the execution of these systems down to the individual who 
interacts with the system every day. In the cases of DTS, WAWF/IRAPT, and GCPC, the 
transactions are instantaneous and transparent and if successful; they provide real-time 
updates to the end user. Due to network application of these systems, the flexibility of 
accessing them from various locations is possible with an Internet connection and a Common 
Access Card connection.  
b. Weaknesses 
These systems are primarily web-based, which in an austere environment is not 
always easy to come across. The Marine Corps does have the ability to create a network 
connection that can support bandwidth demands through an air card, among other means; 
however, those network connectivity services may not be as reliable depending on some 
environmental factors, or the method of connectivity. Additionally, to conduct even routine 
business on some of these applications, such as DTS or GCSS-MC, requires a massive amount 
of relatively consistent data connectivity that puts a strain on the input and output of the 
networks. A hardline connection via a wired Ethernet cable is still the best option, which may 
not be readily accessible.  
These systems also do not communicate with each other, nor do they seamlessly 
connect with other systems within the DoD. The systems used for logistics requests, 
Transportation Capacity Planning Tool along with Common Logistics Command and Control 
System, do not interface with each other, and any movements requiring supply support must 
be accompanied with an additional GCSS-MC request. If the requestor submits a contract 
action, and approval made, the invoices must also be submitted to WAWF/IRAPT, which 
only creates an additional, and unnecessary, step in the entire process.  
c. Opportunities 
Expanding the uses of these applications to include a broader variety set of capabilities 
can assist the MAGTF commander to accomplish their mission. The adoption of these 
capacities within these platforms can provide newfound flexibility to the MAGTF 
commanders. Updates such as the user interface update to the DTS portal, the GCSS-MC R12 
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Update, and updates to the GCPC online features enable a more streamlined method of 
conducting business. These are easier to accomplish due to their online web-based application, 
as well as they have a commercial sector counterpart. These systems can continuously be 
modified to meet the need of the Marine Corps.  
d. Threats 
As with any online system, there is an inherent security threat. Due to the nature of 
these systems being online, the chances of them being hacked into by any individual, private 
corporate agency, or state level hackers is a characteristically innate risk. These are mitigated 
by a defensive system such as firewalls, multi-factor authentication, layered security systems, 
but they do not always work. As no online system can ultimately be one hundred percent 
protected, the threat of these online systems is always there.  
3. Conclusion 
The PR-Builder, the GCPC program, WAWF/IRAPT, DTS, and GCSS-MC are all 
platforms with which the Marine Corps meets current needs. These systems are all web-based 
and even though they all require an Internet connection, connectivity over the past 15 years 
has been steadily increasing thus improving reliability. Improvements to how GCSS-MC is 
utilized have bridged the gap to enable the Marine Corps to continue doing business. Constant 
monitoring and security updates to these platforms assist in keeping hackers from entering 
into the systems and causing instability within them. As there are opportunities to improve 
the effectiveness of all the platforms through various means, such as: raising the micro-
purchase threshold or creating a more streamlined and deployable version of GCSS-MC that 
requires less data, these advancements can enhance the lethality of a mission-set, or add 
flexibility to the MAGTF commander.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter showed you the status quo, COA 1, through the three pillars 
of people, processes, and platforms within the Marine Corps. The next chapter, Chapter IV, 
will go introduce three different COAs for people, discuss two additional processes that the 
Marine Corps can adopt, and an expansion of one of the platforms.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
In this chapter, this report will present comprehensive and viable alternatives and 
options for the Marine Corps to implement in order to optimize the utility of their 
contracting capabilities. The first section will offer alternatives to the talent management 
model the Marine Corps currently uses for commissioned KOs. Then the following section 
will present possibilities for internal changes the Marine Corps could adopt that would 
enable the organization’s ability to acquire new technology rapidly. Lastly, in platforms, 
this report will provide insight into efforts in the trial phase which have promise for service-
wide adoption. Due to the lack of technical understanding, this report will not attempt to 
offer recommendations or options for an optimal contracting system, but will instead 
identify what an optimal system should be able to do.  
First and foremost, in order for the Marine Corps to reap the maximum benefits out 
of their contracting capabilities, there will need to be a shift in how contracting operations 
are perceived. The traditional way the Marine Corps manages its KOs signals to a 
perception that contracting is a sub-activity of supply, which itself is viewed as a sub-
activity of logistics. While in a purely tactical sense this perception can be effective, it is 
not efficient, and it does not provide the optimum capabilities to the warfighter. Instead, 
contracting should be seen with a more operational mindset. Contracting is not a sub-
activity of supply or logistics, but an enabler of both activities, all of which fall under the 
ultimate goal of ensuring warfighters have what they need when they need it. If the Marine 
Corps wants to obtain the competitive advantage contracting can offer, senior leaders will 
need to adjust their perceptions of how talent management and contracting processes are 
implemented.  
A. PEOPLE 
This section will cover the analysis of three alternatives to the way the Marine 
Corps currently manages talent within the contracting officer corps. Arguably, people are 
the pivotal first element in the three pillars of contracting. The way commissioned KO 
assignments are managed right now is indicative of the larger Marine Corps thought 
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process. The Marine Corps views KOs as a tactical asset, and as such, KOs fall under the 
same monitor that manages supply and logistics officers. According to Title 10, § 1721, 
contracting is one of the twelve required positions which are considered acquisition 
positions (Designation of Acquisition Positions, 2018). The current Marine Corps talent 
management structure for KOs does not comply with this statutory requirement. The first 
step towards optimizing contracting activities is to realign commissioned KOs under a 
different monitor for billet assignments. For example, moving the management of KO 
assignments to the same monitor that oversees 8059 Marine acquisition officer.  
1. COA 2: Permanent Transfer 
There are three distinct differences between COA 2 and the status quo. First, under 
this alternative, the selection to KO will not be exclusive to 3002 supply officers. For 
implementation, this deviation would begin when a Marine officer applies to the CPIB and 
CCLEB. The eligibility pool screened by CPIB and CCLEB would be opened to allow 
0402 logistics officers to apply for the 815 curriculum at NPS. The 815 curriculum would 
not need to be modified. Any student in the program would graduate with DAWIA 
contracting Level III education and meet the 24 business credit hour requirement. 
Secondly, the next deviation from the status quo is that the transfer to KO will be a 
permanent lateral transfer. As with the status quo, each newly graduated KO would execute 
orders to their first contracting billet. However, unlike the current approach, KOs will not 
go back to their original MOS. Upon completion of their first tour, KOs would receive an 
assignment to a follow-on contracting tour or a B-billet. B-billet opportunities should be 
kept to a minimum due to the highly technical nature of the contracting profession. The 
final deviation in this alternative is the requirement for advancement and command 
equivalent opportunities to be built into the contracting field. 
Figure 2 depicts what the progression of an officer could look like in COA 2. This 
model assumes that an officer has no prior enlisted service and is selected to the 815 
program after completing one tour as either a 3002 supply officer or a 0402 logistics officer. 
This progression also assumes that because officers will be permanently transferring to the 
3006 OCS officer MOS, there is the possibility some will be assigned to B-billets. The 
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figure also shows the opportunity KOs in this alternative have to apply for the 8059 Marine 
acquisition officer MOS. This progression is not a guarantee as many factors affect the 
timing and assignments officer get throughout their career. This is merely an example of 
the possibilities afforded by this alternative.  
 
Figure 2. Sample Officer Progression through COA 2 
a. Analysis 
This section will discuss COA 2 through a SWOT analysis.  
(1) Strengths 
There are three distinct advantages of this alternative which mitigate weaknesses in 
the status quo. First, because, the current system screens all 3002 supply officer eligible 
for CPIB and CCLEB for selection to the 815 curriculum at NPS, sometimes selects 
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officers who did not apply for or desire to be KOs. Opening up the eligibility to include 
0402 logistics offices, not only increases the size of the pool of available officers, but it 
increases the competition to get the highest quality officers into the contracting field. 
Properly advertising the opportunities afforded in the KO community to a larger pool 
would enable converting the selection process to one of the screening applications, rather 
than screening every eligible 3002 supply officer.  
Secondly, as identified in Chapter III, based on their graduation dates, the average 
TIS of the 20 officers selected for the 815 curriculum from FY16 to FY18 is 13.1 years. 
Of those 20 officers selected only four did not have prior enlisted service, which lowed the 
average TIS. The Marine Corps cannot discriminate and deny Marines with prior enlisted 
service from applying, but they can put an application and selection prerequisite to be for 
an officer not to exceed ten years of TIS at application to the 815 curriculum. This 
requirement would be for the health of the commissioned KO community. At graduation, 
these officers would be at a maximum of 12 years TIS and would be able to conduct 
multiple KO tours upon graduation. Opening the pool increases the likeliness of finding 
officers who desire the MOS and who have the TIS to conduct multiple tours in the 
community. These conditions will also enable these highly qualified and desiring KOs to 
be competitive to pursue the 8059 Marine acquisition officer MOS as Majors.  
Thirdly, the current model does not have a stable set of commissioned KOs who 
can benefit from back to back KO tours. One of the primary concerns among Marine Corps 
contracting professionals, active duty and civilian, is the loss of proficiency in a highly 
technical function such as contracting. Contracting is the least stagnant function within the 
Marine Corps and the one it has the least control over in terms of policy. Unlike any other 
field in the DoD, contracting is heavily constrained by entities outside of the DoD. 
Contracting policy is regularly changed through congressional mandates, in the name of 
adopting better business practices. The DoD cannot stray from what is required by 
constantly changing statutes, policies, and regulations. This external pressure has increased 
as the amount of funds allocated through contracting has surpassed half of the funds 
allocated to each of the four services. In such a field, even an officer with an optimal ability 
to retain knowledge would still be out of date with processes after a two or three-year 
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period out of the field. This alternative affords commissioned KOs the possibility of doing 
back to back KO tours and benefit from a sustained and compound knowledge building 
opportunity.  
Finally, the consecutive tours better prepare KOs to serve as planners within OCS. 
Just as the Marine Corps does not put junior officers in planning roles with the MEF and 
MLG staff sections, inexperienced KOs should not be placed into OCS roles within the 
CCF. Possessing one or more utilization tours with the contracting profession better 
enables the KOs to give optimized recommendations to operational planners when they are 
emplaced within an OSC role. As the Marine Corps speaks about reducing the reliance on 
the iron mountain concept described in Chapter I, newer and innovative ideas on how to 
develop a feasible logistical network is necessary to the holistic mission set. The KOs 
described under the COA 2 design, will provide an optimized set of capabilities gained 
with successive KO tours, which would have immediate impacts on how the Marine Corps 
plans for their operations and exercises.  
(2) Weaknesses 
In order for this process to effectively get the highest quality officers to be 
interested and apply, it must be properly advertised. There is a current weakness in how 
information about NPS is disseminated to the fleet. There are many simple ways in which 
the Marine Corps can ensure the widespread delivery of information regarding contracting 
and other opportunities offered at NPS. The MMOA roadshow could coordinate with bases 
ahead of time to have NPS graduates volunteer to partake in either a questions and answers 
session or give a brief during the MMOA roadshow to inform officers of what NPS has to 
offer. Another option is the creation of a short and concise course on MarineNet which 
educates officers on the slew of opportunities they have available to them when they apply 
for CPIB or CCLEB. Currently, information is not widely available or understood which 
would significantly affect the number of applications to the program.  
The lack of built-in command equivalent opportunities will potentially be a 
hindrance to recruiting top talent into the contracting field. Currently, the Marine Corps 
bypasses the lack of command opportunities within the contracting community by sending 
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KOs back to command billets within the supply officer community. Under this alternative, 
transfer to KO would be permanent and transferring back to another MOS for the sake of 
command opportunities will no longer be an option. If the Marine Corps wants to pursue 
this alternative, command equivalent opportunities must be built into the structure. The 
easiest would be for the Marine Corps to parrot the other services when it comes to 
considering top KO positions, the Head of Contracting Activity, for example, command 
equivalent. The level of responsibility, both over funds and personnel, is deserving of 
command equivalency consideration. These billets should have a screening process as well, 
to select the highest quality officers from among the eligible commissioned KO population; 
just like all other command positions. There is also the opportunity for commissioned KOs 
to compete and conduct command type B-billets, such as Recruiting Command 
Commanding Officer or the ability to ascend to the 8059 Marine acquisition officer MOS. 
The more difficult approach, due to T/O change requirement, will be adding billets at 
command equivalent positions in locations such as DCMA or Combined Fleet Tours. 
(3) Opportunities 
Currently, the Marine Corps does not employ commissioned KOs any differently 
than enlisted KO. The latest training and readiness (T&R) Manual does not list a single 
task which can only be carried out by commissioned KOs. This brings to questions why 
the Marine Corps has uniformed commissioned KO? The most apparent reason the Marine 
Corps would want commissioned KOs is for the leverage rank brings into MAGTF or joint 
exercise or operation planning meetings. This is a reasonable justification for a 
commissioned KO, but only using commissioned KOs for the leverage they bring to the 
planning table is a gross underutilization of the capabilities their contracting education 
could bring to the Marine Corps. 
Commissioned KOs earn an MBA from NPS with a focus on contracting which 
provides them with all the education requirements for DAWIA level 3 certification. 
Making KO a permanent transfer increases opportunities for utilizing them to do more. 
After finishing their first tour, post-NPS, a KO will have the experience necessary to be 
fully DAWIA level 2 certified. These officers are ‘over-credentialed’ to only act within 
 
41 
contingency environments or the realm of SAP. In the Marine Corps, all Marine officers 
must attend The Basic School (TBS). TBS trains and educates every Marine officer to be 
a provisional rifle platoon commander and engrains in the mind of all officers who the 
warfighter is. Yet, the Marine Corps does not place a commissioned KO in major 
acquisition program offices to help advice the program manager (PM) with a focus on both 
the needs of the warfighter and the options governing contracting policies provide.  
The value of the reliability and continuity that civilian KO brings to the Marine 
Corps cannot be overstated. There are many benefits to having a stable presence when one 
of the factors often identified by Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports is the 
lack of proper documentation or experience among acquisition professionals. However, 
civilians are far removed from the warfighter and might not always understand what the 
warfighter is asking for. Where a civilian KO might look at a contract as a task composed 
of many subtasks, a uniformed KO should see a mission, an endstate, and a sense of 
urgency to provide quality customer support. The Marine Corps has an opportunity to 
conduct some re-alignment of personnel if it cannot afford to expand personnel, and place 
commissioned KOs where they can best influence the efficient and effective support to the 
warfighter.  
A potential re-alignment would create a roadmap which allowed KOs at the rank 
of Major to pursue the 8059 Marine acquisition officer MOS. With a dedicated KO 
profession, the Marine Corps has the opportunity of placing uniformed KOs to support 
acquisitions. This is not in place of the Marine Corps civilian contracting officers, but to 
bring a different perspective to big acquisitions. The Marine Corps does not currently have 
uniformed KOs participating in the acquisition of major weapons systems. The PM for 
those acquisitions has a civilian contracting workforce. These officers would have enough 
contracting experience that by the time they reach the rank of Lieutenant Colonel they 
could sit on either the source selection evaluation board (SSEB) or source selection 
advisory committee (SSAC) to a major acquisition program. In this position, the officer 
assigned could advise the PM in a way the civilian contracting officers cannot due to the 
lack of FMF experience.  
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One of the primary concerns among Marine Corps contracting professionals, active 
duty and civilian, is the loss of proficiency in a highly technical function such as 
contracting. Contracting is the least stagnant function within the Marine Corps and the one 
it has the least control over in terms of policy. Unlike any other field in the DoD, 
contracting is heavily constrained by entities outside of the DoD. Contracting policy is 
regularly changed through congressional mandates, in the name of adopting better business 
practices. The DoD cannot stray from what is required by constantly changing statutes, 
policies, and regulations. This external pressure has increased as the amount of funds 
allocated through contracting has surpassed half of the funds allocated to each of the four 
services. In such a field, even an officer with an optimal ability to retain knowledge would 
still be out of date with processes after a two or three-year period out of the field. This 
alternative affords commissioned KOs the possibility of doing back to back KO tours and 
benefit from a sustained and compound knowledge building opportunity.  
(4) Threats 
As with all change, adaptation is a threat. In order to optimize the utility of 
contracting within the Marine Corps, contracting must move out from under supply and 
logistics and assume its logical place under acquisitions. Such a change should not be 
implemented before mitigating the initial confusions of how contracts will continue to 
provide support to supply and logistics functions. The relationship between contracting and 
logistics is critical, even though it is not linear. It must be reiterated that contracting is an 
operational asset and it must be leveraged as such. This is not to say that contracting 
activities should not be focused on supporting tactical movements. Ultimately, contracting 
at the operational level can ensure the most effective and efficient support to tactical 
objectives.  
b. Conclusion
This section analyzed COA 2, permanent transfer. Expanding the community 
invites a more competitive selection process, resulting with higher quality officers to enter 
the CCF. That expansion, paired with consecutive KO tours, advance the quality of officers 
that will continue to fill billets within the Marine Corps. The compounding experience 
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gained by back-to-back tours can provide better OCS planners for MAGTF officers. A 
weakness found within this COA would be the lack of command equivalent billets, but this 
can be addressed and rectified by converting officer in charge positions to command 
screened billets. The opportunity this COA can exploit is the ability to enhance the 
capabilities of the CCF to be used for more planning roles within an OCS environment. 
This growth of capacity of the KOs within the Marine Corps would not sacrifice the 
invaluable FMF time prior to selection but capitalizes on their ability to relate to their 
customers, the warfighters. Ultimately the greatest threat to the pursuit of this alternative 
will be universal institutional acceptance. Through this alternative, the Marine Corps would 
be adopting a talent management model similar to that of the Army. This section analyzed 
COA 2, permanent transfer.  
2. COA 3: Contracting Officer as a Primary Military Occupational 
Specialty 
This alternative considers the feasibility and consequences of making 3006 OCS 
officer a PMOS which would be assigned directly from TBS. Keeping in mind that even if 
the Marine Corps is willing to source additional billets for KOs within the total force 
structure, only a small number of new KOs would need to be selected out of TBS each 
year. Since this small number of officers will be graduating TBS at different points, it 
would not be cost effective to develop a commissioned KO course. Rather, in this 
alternative, those officers selected as KOs will receive orders to an RCO where they will 
work on completing their DAWIA contracting education and training online while 
simultaneous conducting OJT. For added benefit, those officers could attend the Ground 
Supply Officers’ Course (GSOC) or attend the contracting officer courses established by 
the Army like the enlisted contracting Marines. Since ground supply is the first level of 
procurement within the Marine Corps, GSOC would enable commissioned KOs to 
understand where they fit within the acquisition cycle. Attending the Army contracting 
courses will facilitate learning some basics in an academic environment before going to 
OJT. Additionally, keeping true to the belief that contracting is more directly aligned with 
acquisitions than it is with logistics, this alternative would have a roadmap which 
encouraged KOs at the rank of Major to compete for the 8059 Marine acquisition officer 
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MOS. Even though these KOs would be selected right out of TBS, the opportunity to attend 
NPS will still be available. However, the curriculum would be updated to afford those 
officers to attend more advanced courses.  
Figure 3 depicts what the progression of an officer could look like in COA 3. This 
model assumes that an officer has no prior enlisted service. This progression also assumes 
that because officers will start in the 3006 OCS officer MOS some of them will be assigned 
to a B-billet at some point in their career. These officers will also have the opportunity to 
attend resident PME and to compete for 8059 Marine acquisition officer MOS. This 
progression is not a guarantee as there are many factors affect the timing and assignments 
officer get throughout their career. This is merely an example of the possibilities afforded 
by this alternative.  
 




This section will discuss COA 3 through a SWOT analysis.  
(1) Strengths 
This Marine Corps has already started to consider imposing a requirement at TBS 
to have officers upload their college transcripts onto Marine Online. Staff platoon 
commanders would have the ability to scan their platoons for those who meet the 24 
business credit hour requirement imposed by Congress on the DoD’s acquisition 
professionals. TBS could also implement a policy where only those officers with the 
required business hours would be allowed to put KO on their top 5 desired MOS list. Even 
though nothing would preclude an officer from meeting the 24 business credit hour 
requirement while in the fleet, taking a more structured approach by assigning the MOS to 
desire officers with a business degree would put those officers ahead of many who have 
been selected in the past. 
More importantly, this alternative has the potential to afford officers more time in 
KO billets. Whereas under the current approach, an officer will get at most three tours in a 
KO billet over a 20-year career, this alternative would enable an officer to serve in as many 
as five KO billets. The first deficiency identified in the Gansler Commission report was, 
“The expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced military officers 
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)” (Army, 2007, p. 2). The report goes on to say, 
“Experienced contracting should never be a first assignment. Contracting personnel sent 
into a theater of operations need to be highly skilled, adequately trained, and prepared for 
the challenging, fast-paced demands of expeditionary operations…This is the Super Bowl, 
not a scrimmage” (Army, 2007, p. 6). This alternative would take advantage of compound 
knowledge building, by giving these officers an opportunity to stay current and retain their 
proficiency in the contracting field. A structured roadmap would ensure that those officers 
deploying to expeditionary environments would be at an appropriate place in their career 
to perform successfully in that complex environment. This capability is only possible if 




The greatest weakness of this alternative is the absence of fleet experience for the 
uniformed KO. In interviews conducted by Captain Corcoran in the process of writing his 
thesis, it was the resounding sentiment among KOs and their leadership that FMF 
experience was invaluable to a KO’s ability to effectively execute their responsibilities 
with an understanding of the customer. This understanding is one of the few things that 
separates uniformed KOs from civilian KOs. Beyond just understanding the customer, 
FMF experience enables an officer to gain insight into how operations happen. Particularly 
for 3002 supply officers and 0402 logistics officers, both of those MOSs are centered 
around customer service to multiple customers in often dynamic situations. FMF 
experience also places both supply and logistics officers in an environment where they 
have to partake in tactical planning. It gives those officers experience in the Marine Corps 
Planning Process (MCPP) and how to best support a unit’s requirements. Both of these 
firsthand experiences in network management and using MCPP to support requirements 
are critical skills for uniformed KOs to have. 
(3) Opportunities 
TBS trains and educates every Marine officer to be a provisional rifle platoon 
commander and engrains in the mind of all officers who the warfighter is. Yet, the Marine 
Corps does not place a commissioned KO in major acquisition program offices to help 
advice the PM with a focus on both the needs of the warfighter and the options governing 
contracting policies provide. The value of the reliability and continuity that civilian KO 
brings to the Marine Corps cannot be overstated. There are many benefits to having a stable 
presence when one of the factors often identified by GAO reports is the lack of proper 
documentation or experience among acquisition professionals. However, civilians are far 
removed from the warfighter and might not always understand what the warfighter is 
asking for. Where a civilian KO might look at a contract as a task composed of many 
subtasks, a uniformed KO should see a mission, an end-state, and a sense of urgency to 
provide quality customer support. The Marine Corps has an opportunity to conduct some 
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re-alignment of personnel if it cannot afford to expand personnel, and place commissioned 
KOs where they can best influence the efficient and effective support to the warfighter.  
A potential re-alignment would create a roadmap which allowed KOs at the rank 
of Major to pursue the 8059 Marine acquisition officer MOS. With a dedicated KO 
profession, the Marine Corps has the opportunity of placing uniformed KOs to support 
acquisitions. This is not in lieu of the Marine Corps civilian contracting officers, but to 
bring a different perspective to big acquisitions. The Marine Corps does not currently have 
uniformed KOs participating in the acquisition of major weapons systems. The PM for 
those acquisitions has a civilian contracting workforce. These officers would have enough 
contracting experience that by the time they reach the rank of Lieutenant Colonel they 
could sit on either the SSEB or SSAC to a major acquisition program. In this position, the 
officer assigned could advise the PM in a way the civilian contracting officers cannot due 
to the lack of FMF experience.  
(4) Threats 
Selecting officers as KOs from TBS would require the growth of the new PMOS to 
have billets available for the new Lieutenants entering the MOS each year. Considering the 
current structure has a staffing goal for nine Lieutenant Colonel and ten Major 3006 OCS 
officer billets to be filled, the manpower requirements needed to be able to satisfy that 
requirement might be more substantial than what the Marine Corps is willing to allocate to 
the commissioned KO community. After the manpower model determines what an optimal 
force number would be at each rank, there will be the bureaucratic struggle of getting the 
increase billets and having them cemented in a T/O. Since the Marine Corps is statutorily 
limited in the total population it can maintain, and it is already reorganizing to 
accommodate cyber and space functions, there is potential that communities from which 
commissioned KO billets will be pulled from will push back.  
b. Conclusion 
This section analyzed COA 3. A strength of this alternative is that commissioned 
KOs would start to build their knowledge and experience as Lieutenants. Its greatest 
weakness is that without FMF experience these officers might not understand their 
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customers or how to best support their needs. Having a community which starts grooming 
Marines earlier can produce more knowledgeable officers through the compound 
knowledge building inherent with the opportunity of back to back KO tours, enables 
officers to be put in billets of greater responsibility. In addition, this course of action would 
afford officers an opportunity to stay current on contracting policies and retain proficiency 
by serving in KO billets more consistently. A threat to this alternative will be getting 
through the bureaucratic process of cementing billets into the total force structure for KOs. 
Though this alternative the Marine Corps would be adopting a more professionalized talent 
management model that is similar to that of the Air Force.  
3. COA 4: Restricted Officers Track 
This alternative seeks to utilize the only avenue by which an officer in a technically 
demanding MOS can be assured they will not leave the FMF. Restricted officers in the 
Marine Corps are exempt from serving in B-billets. They progress through billets of higher 
and higher advisement at which their proficiency and experience best serve the 
commander. The enlisted progression would remain the same. This alternative would take 
effect when a 3044 Contracting Specialist is at eight years of service and eligible to apply 
to be a WO. If selected to be a restricted officer, possibly designated as a 3012 Procurement 
Operations Officer, the Marine would be slated to attend the four-month-long Warrant 
Officer Basic Course (WOBC). The community would have an LDO track to enable these 
highly technical experts to assume billets and leverage the authority or the unrestricted 
ranks. An officer in the restricted route is eligible to submit a package for LDO as soon as 
they are selected for promotion to CWO3. 
Figure 4 depicts what the progression of an officer could look like in COA 4. This 
model assumes that an enlisted Marine would compete for selection to be a restricted 
officer as soon as they hit eight YOS. This model goes on to assume that a CWO2 would 
compete for selection to be an LDO as soon as they are selected for CWO3. This 
progression is not a guarantee as there are many factors affect the timing and assignments 
Marines get throughout their career. This is merely an example of the possibilities afforded 




Figure 4. Sample Officer Progression through COA 4 
a. Analysis 
This section will discuss COA 4 through a SWOT analysis.  
(1) Strengths 
One of the primary concerns among Marine Corps contracting professionals, active 
duty and civilian, is the loss of proficiency in a highly technical function such as 
contracting. Contracting is the least stagnant function within the Marine Corps and the one 
it has the least control over in terms of policy. Unlike any other field in the DoD, 
contracting is heavily constrained by entities outside of the DoD. Contracting policy is 
regularly changed through congressional mandates to adopt better business practices. The 
DoD cannot stray from what is required by constantly changing statutes, policies, and 
regulations. This external pressure has increased as the amount of funds allocated through 
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contracting has surpassed half of the funds allocated to each of the four services. In such a 
field, even an officer with an optimal ability to retain knowledge would still be out of date 
with processes after a two or three-year period out of the field. The Marine Corps already 
has an option in place for retaining officers in highly technical MOSs, where being a subject 
matter expert (SME) is essential to the organization.  
The greatest strength of this alternative is that restricted officers are not pulled out 
of the FMF to fill B-billets. By the time a Marine ascends to WO, they would have, at a 
minimum, achieved Level II DAWIA and had approximately four years of experience in 
contracting. By the time a Marine ascends to LDO Captain, they would have, at a 
minimum, achieved Level III DAWIA and had approximately ten years of experience in 
contracting. Their experience is sustained because as restricted officers they would have 
rarely left the MOS since laterally transferring to it during their first tour of enlistment. 
This entire process is incredibly competitive with multiple layers of screening. In the 
beginning, the requirements for selection to 3044 Contract Specialist are restrictive to a 
Marine’s first tour, and their performance has to be top tier. In order to ascend to WO, 
Marines with a minimum of eight years TIS would need to apply and would be screened 
again for selection to WO. Then again, if a WO decides they want to apply to be an LDO, 
they would undergo another application and screening process. Both the application for 
WO and LDO require command endorsements up to the first general officer in the chain 
of command. Additionally, fitness reports are screened, among several other things to 
ensure the most highly qualified are selected to assume higher responsibility within their 
highly technical field.  
One of the significant weaknesses in the previous alternatives is the lack of 
command opportunities for officers in contracting. This alternative alleviates any concerns 
about retention issues resulting from the lack of command opportunities. By the time an 
LDO makes it to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, they will have, at a minimum, 22 years 
of service. Since a Marine can apply to become a restricted officer with as little as eight 
years of service or as many as 16 years of service, this structure allows these Marines to 
serve for as many as 40 years, at least 35 of which will have been in the contracting field. 
Similarly, another aid to retention from this alternative is the fact that in order for a 
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restricted officer to retire with their officer pay they must serve a minimum of 10 years as 
a commissioned officer. If the Marine does not serve a minimum of 10 years they will retire 
with the high three of the enlisted rank they were when they were selected to be a WO. 
This 10-year requirement and the FMF only restriction means these officers will conduct a 
minimum of three KO tours. The smallest of the strengths of this alternative is the cost 
savings coming from basic pay. Annual pay for a CWO5 with over 38 years of service caps 
out at less than what a Colonel with 21 years of service would make. LDOs will never 
make it to rank above Lieutenant Colonel, and the annual pay for Lieutenant Colonel caps 
out at 22 years of service. The basic pay for prior enlisted Captains and Majors caps out at 
18 years. All of these caps make the WO and LDO community cheaper, in the long run 
than an unrestricted KO community.  
(2) Weaknesses 
The greatest weakness of this alternative is if the Marine Corps wants to increase 
the depth of its contracting capabilities. Title 10 of the United States Code allows an 
exception to the bachelor’s degree requirement for the DoD’s contingency contracting 
force (Contracting positions, 2018). That exemption is how the Marine Corps can issue 
warrants to enlisted personnel. According to Title 10 the contingency contracting force 
consists, “of members of the armed forces whose mission is to deploy in support of 
contingency operations and other operations of the Department of Defense” (Contracting 
positions, 2018). So long as the Marine Corps only intends to use their KOs in the capacity 
of contingency contractors, the lack of a bachelor’s degree will not be a hindrance to 
restricted officers. However, if the Marine Corps wants to do more than expeditionary 
contracting, DAWIA requires KO’s to have a bachelor’s degree. This alternative means 
that Marine Corps could not afford KOs a route to the 8059 Marine acquisition officer 
MOS or support Big “A” acquisition contracting activities with uniformed KOs. As 
mentioned earlier, while the value of the Marine Corps’ civilian contractors cannot be 
overstated, there is value added to having a Marine, focused on the warfighter, in 
contracting offices that support Marines. An additional weakness rises from how different 
this alternative is from the status quo. It would take at least a decade to grow a CWO and 




The first deficiency identified in the Gansler Commission report was, “The 
expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced military officers and 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs)” (Army, 2007, p. 2). The report goes on to say, 
“Experienced contracting should never be a first assignment. Contracting personnel sent 
into a theater of operations need to be highly skilled, adequately trained, and prepared for 
the challenging, fast-paced demands of expeditionary operations…This is the Super Bowl, 
not a scrimmage” (Army, 2007, p. 6). This alternative reaps the maximum benefits of 
compound knowledge built from years of contracting experience. Through their years of 
experience, these officers will know the guiding policies, statues, and laws so well that they 
will not feel constrained by the little they understand. This capability is only possible if 
officers are allowed to remain within the community. With the alternative, the Marine 
Corps has the opportunity to build the most professional and proficient expeditionary 
contracting force out of all the services.  
Many of the billets for Majors and Lieutenants in the status quo are planning billets. 
Even though it is incredibly rare for restricted officers to attend resident PME, it is a 
possibility. As far as the Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School and the Command 
and Staff College, it varies from community to community, but in highly competitive 
communities, restricted officers are highly encouraged to conduct the distance learning 
version. There is also nothing that precludes the Marine Corps from sending restricted 
officers to the Marine Corps Logistics (MCLOG) Course soon after being selected to LDO. 
The combination of proficiency of expeditionary contracting and an understanding of 
MCPP at the operational level gained at MCLOG and PME will enable these officers to 
participate in planning at the level required in these contract planning billets. Especially in 
the Marine Forces Command billets, the experience and proficiency of these officers would 
enable their active participation OCS integration cells.  
Even though restricted officers would not be able to be KOs for the acquisition of 
major weapons systems, with their depth of knowledge and experience there is an 
opportunity for an LDO Major or Lieutenant Colonel to sit on either the SSEB or SSAC to 
a major acquisition program. In this position, the officer assigned could advise the PM in 
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a way the civilian contracting officers cannot due to the lack of FMF experience. The only 
other exception to the requirement for KOs to have a bachelor’s degree, other than 
contingency contracting, is the use of OTA. Technically someone does not have to have, 
contracting experience to use OTAs, even though that is highly discouraged. Restricted 
officers would be able to execute and oversee the use of OTAs just like any unrestricted 
officer.  
(4) Threats 
The biggest threat to this alternative venture is going to be cultural. There is a 
perception that higher education fosters the critical thinking environment. In his 2012 
Marine Corps Gazette article, Major John D. Jordan identified a lack of critical thinking 
among unrestricted officers. He attributed to the poor quality of American higher education 
and highlighted a study which revealed that students attending four-year institutions were 
not achieving any measurable amount of learning (Jordan, 2012). In a 2009 Marine Corps 
Gazette article, Captain Mathew Van Echo identifies the institutionalized way in which the 
Marine Corps fails to create an environment for divergent thinkers to grow. He also 
suggests several low-level methods in which the Marine Corps can foster the kind of 
environment in which divergent thinkers can excel (Van Echo, 2009). Both Major Jordan 
and Captain Van Echo identify and appreciate the valuable experience, and convergent 
thinking has in individual and institutional success. This alternative will naturally foster 
convergent thinking, borne of experience; however, the community will have to adopt a 
framework that institutionalizes critical thinking. 
There is also this notion that since no other service has pursued this avenue that it 
must be ineffective. This train of thought ignores that each branch is different. The Air 
Force does not have restricted officers. Therefore, their talent management is built to keep 
unrestricted officers in their specialty. The Air Force is the only service in which a person 
can commission and immediately assume the contracting profession. Their contracting 
officers participate in large acquisitions. Even though they do not start their contracting 
officers out as Second Lieutenants, the Army has uniformed contracting officers involved 
across the entire spectrum of acquisition operations. In comparison, the Navy and the 
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Marine Corps come across as the least professionalized uniformed contracting force. 
Taking into consideration the size of the Marine Corps, it would be flawed to assume the 
Marine Corps should or will ever have a contracting force as capable as that of the Air 
Force or the Army. However, the contingency environment is different from a domestic 
contracting environment. It has special laws, statutes, and regulations. This alternative 
guarantees that the Marine Corps would have the most proficient contingency contracting 
force. This force would have the level of experience which could prove to be an asset to 
the Joint Force during the planning or execution of joint operations in deployed 
environments across the range of military operations.  
b. Conclusion 
This section analyzed COA 4. Even though this alternative is the most divergent 
from the current process, it is the most effective at guaranteeing a proficient contingency 
contracting officer force. This alternative provides the Marine Corps an opportunity to be 
the premier contingency contracting force of the DoD. Conversely, if the Marine Corps 
wanted to increase its contracting capacity beyond contingency contracting or OTAs, this 
alternative would not allow for that increase due to the fact restricted officers are not 
required to have bachelor’s degrees. Through this alternative, the Marine Corps would be 
adopting an entirely divergent talent management model.  
B. PROCESSES 
The next part of this analysis will consist of discussing alternative methods in which 
the Marine Corps can procure technology, goods, or services. More specifically, this 
section will go into detail about the mindsets in which a KO can explore to acquire said 
technology, goods, and services rather than the specific vehicles. As discussed previously 
in Chapter III, contracting as a provider is not the focal point within the MAGTF, but rather 
an afterthought when it may be too late to leverage contracting to its full potential.  
1. Other Transaction Authority 
Other transaction authority, more commonly known as OTAs, is an authorized 
method in which government agencies can procure prototypes, or fund research and 
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development efforts in a more rapid atmosphere. The authorization for the use of OTAs 
derived from Title 10 § 2371b and was identified in Section 815 from the 2016 NDAA. 
The other transactions that are authorized under the OTA umbrella are intended to fulfill 
the need of the government, as would a traditional contract; however, OTAs differs from 
traditional contracts because the FAR does not govern them. Due to the rapid emergence 
of new technology, locating companies that specialize in that technology has become more 
time constraining and arduous. Companies that find themselves in the process of creating 
new technology, inventing new ways of utilizing technology, or developing methods in 
which existing technology could be coupled together, are not typically started within a 
large company, but in the garage with the inventor and their idea. Company giants such as 
Apple and Alphabet, and the initial conception of the Predator drone are all examples of 
businesses started in their garage.  
In the current climate of the policy-making, the FAR would not usually allow the 
DoD to do business with these companies without requiring them to meet responsibility 
determinations found in FAR 9.104-1. Many of these companies do not have the bandwidth 
or the venture capital opportunities to develop their idea as well as become a government 
contractor. OTAs are intended to attract ‘non-traditional defense contractors’ in supporting 
these government requirements. Title 10 § 2302 defines a non-traditional contractor as: 
An entity that is not currently performing and has not performed, for at least 
one-year period preceding the solicitation sources by the Department of 
Defense for the procurement or transaction, any contract or subcontract for 
the Department of Defense that is subject to the full coverage under the cost 
accounting standards prescribed pursuant to Section 1502 of title 41 and 
the regulations implementing such section. (Definitions, 2018)  
The OTA handbook also proceeds to state that OTAs can also be awarded to 
traditional defense contractors so long as a non-traditional contractor performs to a 
significant extent, i.e., the non-traditional contractor perform the services rendered by the 
contract. These grassroots companies mark a transitional point when in discussion with the 
DoD procurement and acquisition processes. Defense conglomerates such as Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, or Raytheon have the ability to sub-contract out services rendered to one 
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of these non-traditional contractors and cover the plethora of policies, as directed by the 
FAR.  
As there are different colors of money, appropriated funds derived from 
congressional authority for a specific use, OTAs can only be used in prototyping or 
research and development efforts. This means that once the prototyping or research and 
development efforts are completed, there is no guarantee for a procurement contract. This 
differs from traditional FAR contracts. The funding for FAR-based contracts can be linked 
to where the need or at what phase of the acquisition cycle it may fall in. There can be 
research and development or prototyping contracts, procurement contracts, and even 
operations and maintenance contracts.  
An additional way in which OTAs differ from FAR-based contracts, and arguably 
the most substantial difference, is the level of interaction allowed to be held between the 
requirements generator, the buyer, and the company awarded the OTA, the seller. During 
traditional FAR contracts communication regarding the requirement itself can only occur 
during the solicitation, source selection, and pre-award phases; furthermore, during the 
source selection phase, all communication with potential vendors must stop once the first 
bid is submitted. The reason why is because once the contract is signed with a statement of 
objective (SOO) or statement of work (SOW), the contractor must provide the good, 
services or technology rendered in the SOO or SOW. Changes cannot be made without 
initiating administrative paperwork that draws from the changes clause, such as a unilateral 
or bilateral contract modification. 
The OTA’s method of acquisition has a much more fluid and interactive 
communicative process. Congress allows the DoD to use OTAs as a means to add 
flexibility in the acquisition cycle. The regulations that dictate how OTAs can be used are 
not restricted by the FAR, and therefore allow the DoD, furthermore the government 
holistically, to speak with the awarded vendor throughout the process. This act intends to 
ensure that the DoD will receive a viable end product, whether physical or intangible, 
which can meet the government’s need and satisfy a government requirement. As seen in 
the industry, research and development as well as the prototyping of rudimentary concepts, 
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do not always pan out, and the amount of the time and money spent on each one needs to 
be reduced in order to exercise sound business practices. 
a. Analysis 
This section will discuss the increased use of OTAs within the Marine Corps 
through a SWOT analysis.  
(1) Strengths 
The use of OTAs can give the Marine Corps the flexibility discussed in Chapter I. 
Technology in today’s world is increasing at a rapid rate, one in which the current 
acquisition cycle cannot keep up with. Testing out new concepts to enhance the Marine 
Corps’ warfighting ability is incredibly important, especially with the move away from 
OIF and OEF type campaigns. The ever-changing mission requirements may entail a 
changing set of technological advancements. This change would not eliminate the need for 
traditional FAR-based contracting efforts, OTAs would be another tool that a MAGTF 
commander would have at their disposal.  
Due to the more unrestricted nature of the OTA agreements, speed can be 
prioritized when designing these technologies. John C. Maxwell, a public speaker and 
author who writes about leadership, said the famous phrase “fail early, fail often, but 
always fail forward.” This quote is not typically used within the DoD big “A” acquisitions 
due to the bureaucracy that dictates the process, in fact, the big “A” process is seen as a 
necessary yet inefficient process. Industry, mainly for-profit companies, test and conduct 
research in areas of potential ROI at the cyclic rate to see which efforts will make their 
investment of time and money worthwhile. The strength here is that programs will have 
the flexibility to be adjusted and ‘scraped’ if need be without wasting tens of millions of 
tax payer’s dollars, years within the bureaucratic system, and manpower hours. The power 
of OTAs can allow rapid changes to models, keeping up with the new technology, or the 
new requirements and increase the rate in which failure occurs. All of these are arguably 




OTAs are not the end-all, be-all to acquisition concerns; there are weaknesses 
associated with them. Although not a new procurement method, as they have been in 
existence since the early 2000s, there is merely a newer realized focus on utilizing them 
for acquisitions. This associated new program is met with hesitancy for many reasons, 
whether it has not been utilized before, improper performance by other agencies, or 
misperceived results after the completion of an OTA. Commanders do not fully trust OTAs 
to accomplish the mission of what they are tasked with because they do not trust it. This 
first obstacle will have to be surpassed by direct orders by those at high command levels 
or by the sheer initiative of those at the lower, more operational, levels.  
Another weakness with the OTA process is the training required to become certified 
in awarding the OTAs. Currently, there is no standardized and required training by the 
Marine Corps, yet multiple agencies within the Marine Corps use OTAs. From the research 
gathered, MARCORSYSCOM, Marine Corps Warfare Lab, Marine Corps I&L, as well as 
DIU, all are experimenting with OTAs; however, all of these organizations design their 
training guidelines to use OTAs in their acquisition pipeline. The units within the Marine 
Corps that are currently testing the OTAs process are not required to work together to share 
results nor lessons learned throughout the process.  
(3) Opportunities 
To date OTA use has been limited, beyond that, no military service uses OTAs at 
the operational or tactical level. Most of the services see the OTA as a substitute for the 
big “A” acquisition process, although a valid usage of them, a missed opportunity. Most of 
the DoD agencies agree that OTAs can assist with the prototyping phases of technology, 
but only within the concepts of big projects. The missed opportunity relies within the lower 
levels of acquisition that OTAs can be utilized. No dollar amount limits the use of OTAs, 
nor is there a regulation that dictates what acquisition levels can explore the usage of OTAs. 
This has the potential to take concepts, from all ranks within the Marine Corps, through 
the OTA process and see if it is feasible to invest money further. Since these acquisition 
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frameworks can be relatively inexpensive, you can invest in more ideas for the purposes of 
further researching potential designs.  
Another aspect of the OTA field that the Marine Corps is not currently utilizing is 
having an OTA Advocate at each base under the RCO. This OTA advocate can bring the 
OTA process to a more tactical level instead of merely keeping at a more strategic level 
with large acquisitions, such as programs of record. The OTA Advocate is a warranted KO 
that understands the aspects of what OTAs can provide to the warfighter, and what 
flexibility that it can bring to the major subordinate commands, whether that is at the 
Marine Division, Marine Aircraft Wing, or the Marine Logistics Group. This OTA 
advocate could also provide a potential way forward for the continuing operational 
challenges that continue to occur. The concepts developed to answer those challenges, 
could turn into an OTA avenue in which MARCORSYSCOM could further pursue. 
Additionally, these smaller projects can utilize the remaining operations & maintenance 
funding since they are on a smaller level, thus reducing the need for solidifying a position 
within the program objective memorandum (POM) process.  
(4) Threats 
Any acquisition strategy has faults, and OTAs are no different; they share the same 
threats as traditional FAR contracts. Not having a full understanding of the requirements, 
awarding the OTA agreements to companies that do not meet the capability to produce 
feasible prototypes, as well as collusion. Larger companies may create, or buy out, a 
subsidiary in order to win the additional awards while still covering the overhead through 
their main company name.  
Another threat is the transition from the OTA to the procurement process. For large 
projects, the procurement process requires funding to be included in the presidential 
budget; the POM process usually accomplishes this. Historically, the submission of the 
projects is five years prior to the date in which they receive funding. The inherent nature 
of the OTAs is that they are rapid in nature, and are produced in a relatively short amount 
of time, which is not typically enough time for the POM process to catch up. This creates 
a need for identification of the potential projects to have space within the POM process, 
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with no guarantee that the OTA will develop anything that can have associated funding for 
Congress to vote on.  
DIU currently has active duty Marines stationed at the headquarters in Mountain 
View, California; however, the Marines that are located do not possess an acquisition or 
contracting background. They do maintain a working understanding of the acquisition and 
contracting process but do not have any traditional understanding of the FAR and the 
regulations that must be enforced when partaking in traditional FAR contracts. The threat 
here is the missed potential by not having formal contracting or acquisition trained Marines 
working at DIU. The structure cannot support any large balance of Marine projects due to 
the lack of personnel and specialties, nor can explore the transition between the prototyping 
OTA to the procurement FAR contract. Additionally, all Marine related projects must go 
through the Air Force and Army contracting personnel in order to be pass through the 
requirements to pursue the OTA agreement. As the fundamental processes between the 
four services vary significantly, the goals of the Marine Corps are cut short due to the lack 
of investment of personnel within DIU.  
b. Conclusion  
Overall, OTAs offer another process for research and develop projects where the 
end state of the development efforts is not readily known or apparent. The flexibility OTAs 
provide to adapting and adjusting the prototyping efforts during the process alone can 
change the factors enabling commanders to choose an outcome to accomplish their mission 
better. The strengths and opportunities have the ability to open more doors to the Marine 
Corps acquisition process, which although already authorized by Congress, not currently 
utilized on a scale to match the goals of the Marine Corps. The lack of collaboration efforts 
between DIU, MARCORSYSCOM, among the other USMC agencies leveraging OTAs 
illustrates the incomplete thought process that Marine Corps currently maintains.  
Holistically, OTAs do not have the intent, nor can they replace traditional FAR 
contracting efforts due to their appropriation funding restrictions. The breadth of 
knowledge required to comprehend the entire acquisition process, from the prototyping 
OTAs agreements through the procurement FAR contract, is an intensive task that the 
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Marine Corps is not currently utilizing. Training for OTA professionals are regionally 
specific, and those selected lack the credentials to make a substantial impact on the process 
and mindset. Lastly, OTAs can be used on a variety of scales, from program of record 
(POR) to smaller acquisition methods, but the lack of understanding of the OTA process 
restricts those in decision making positions from making a long-lasting change to the way 
the Marine Corps thinks about procurement. The OTA process can be exploited to enhance 
not only the strategic goals but the operational and tactical ones as well.  
2. Program of Record 
It is a simple reality that nothing is possible without money. Regardless of it can be 
done cheaply or if it is expensive, nothing will get done without the funds to pay for it. The 
system by which the services obtain funds is just as convoluted as the federal acquisition 
system. In the DoD funds must be approved through the planning, programming, budgeting 
and Execution (PPBE) process. In order for a system to be funded, it must be deemed a 
POR and built into the current future years’ defense program (FYDP). According to the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the official definition of a “POR” is:  
A program as recorded in the current Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP) or as updated from the last FYDP by approved program 
documentation (e.g., Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), Acquisition 
Strategy, or Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)). The term Program of 
Record may also refer to a program having successfully achieved formal 
program initiation, for example by assignment of a designated program 
manager. (Defense Acquisition University, 2018) 
Even though it is nowhere in the definition, the term POR is often associated with 
a physical manifestation of a system. However, this false notion limits the potential of what 
can be acquired as a POR and how said program could keep pace with the private sector. 
More and more the DoD is procuring items with a technological shelf life. The current 
acquisition process ensures that the technology the DoD obtains is out of date by the time 
it reaches the operating forces. This is no way to do business if the DoD wants to be 
competitive with an adversary that is not constrained by a FAR.  
An example of how this alternative mindset could be implemented is the Marine 
Corps’ current pursuit of the capability to use a swarm of drones to overwhelm and distract 
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adversaries. Defining the capability as the physical attainment of drones to build swarm 
into the FYDP would make the drones the focus of the program. However, due to the speed 
with which drone technology is evolving, by the time the program is fielded, it has already 
lived past its technological shelf life. Instead, the PM should build the PORs around the 
concept of swarm. Much like the concept of parent-child relationships in the GCSS-MC, 
the swarm concept would be the parent, and the drones themselves would be the children. 
The contract for the POR would address a life cycle maintenance plan. Instead of only 
focusing the repairs and maintenance contract elements of the end-item, the contract for 
the life cycle maintenance plan would focus on defining the intervals at which the drone, 
or elements within the drone, will be replaced by the prime contractor. This will ensure the 
capability is defined as a POR, but the equipment itself is not anchored to the program. 
The 21st Century has been laden with exponential technological advancements. 
The first iPhone was released in 2007, and earlier this year Apple released the iPhone 
10XS. That means that Apple has released a newer and more capable model of their iPhone 
approximately once a year. Comparing the two models would further demonstrate how 
much technology has genuinely evolved. In a world where technology is evolving that 
quickly in the private sector, the government cannot afford to be left behind. This approach 
is best fit for capabilities which are primarily based on the use of commercial technology. 
Due to its commercial nature, market research would allow the acquisition team to predict 
how often new technology will be available. The contract should be built in a way as to 
define the intervals at which it will be expected that the contractor will upgrade specific 
components at that predicted interval. Similarly, market research will also allow the 
government to predict how much replacements at the predicted intervals will cost. The 
government will not be requesting technology in beta testing. The government will require 
a finalized product for the replacements as they are correlated to their public releases. 
Specifically, within the Marine Corps, these replacements could be pushed out through the 
use of modification instruction messages. Depending on the vulnerability to the system, 
how quickly or staggered the replacement process would be part of the acquisition plan.  
 
63 
a. Analysis  
This section will discuss adopting a different approach to POR through a SWOT 
analysis. 
(1) Strengths 
One of the strengths of this approach is that its adoption will not require any 
restructuring, as there is no law, statute, policy or regulation which requires that a POR be 
a physical manifestation. The execution of this approach can and will be simple to 
implement and can start to be utilized immediately. What will be required for this approach 
to be adopted will be a change in the way the capabilities are defined. Historically programs 
of record are known as ‘legacy systems’ and stay in service for long periods of time. This 
conception limits the possibility of adopting new technologies where needed even though 
no law, statue, policy or regulation states that the acquisition process must follow this 
notion.  
Since the capability is not tied to the equipment itself, but to the concept of what 
satisfies the requirement, the conceptual programs of record created under this approach 
can keep up with how quickly technology is evolving in the private sector. The 
technological aspects written into the original contract, or limitations to the technological 
abilities of current technology are no longer roadblocks within the holistic life cycle 
management plan. If the DoD deems a capability as critical to mission accomplishment 
throughout the various services, it is imperative the equipment should keep pace with the 
evolving technology.  
(2) Weaknesses 
A weakness of this approach is that it requires immense critical thinking in its 
implementation; it cannot be indiscriminately used. The government cannot use this in the 
acquisition of technology that is specifically developed for the use of the government. 
Those types of requirements are unique. For example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter cannot 
be defined as a concept and require the contractor to upgrade the interface or any of the 
other sub-components in a set time frame because no amount of market research will be 
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able to reveal when the capabilities will be obsolete. Even if the concept approach is used 
correctly, for example, to procure a network, another weakness of this approach is that its 
success depends heavily on market research and how well the contract for the acquisition 
is defined. The acquisition team will need to take a critical look at those components within 
the work breakdown structure which are mostly made up of commercial technology. Then, 
extensive market research will need to be conducted on expected upgrade intervals and 
cost. Finally, the contract will need to be built using the information gained through the 
research.  
(3) Opportunities 
The newly fielded equipment’s ability to evolve reduces risk and increases security. 
So long as this is employed correctly, the approach gives the government the opportunity 
to develop large commercial programs that will keep pace with technology developed in 
the private sector. For example, a cyber-network is comprised of both hardware and 
software, most of which is commercial. Through this approach, the DoD would define the 
POR as the concept of the capability. Then within the contract, after extensive research, 
the acquisition team will provide the KO the time requirements when components such as 
the software, routers, and other such items will be expected to be replaced. The KO would 
merely submit a release order to have the contractor replace the old hardware. Specifically, 
when it comes to networks, having outdated equipment puts the enterprise at risk, and many 
times makes it incompatible with new equipment being fielded. The implementation of this 
approach also presents an opportunity for the DoD to save time on acquisitions. By defining 
the requirement as a concept and being able to build the contract in a way that life cycle 
management means upgraded equipment, the DoD will not have to worry about having to 
create an entire POR to replace the outdated program.  
(4) Threats 
The immense and immediate critical thinking required to use this approach 
effectively is itself a threat. This specific approach to a POR requires a level of contracting 
experience and forethought not traditionally seen within the contracting field. The lack of 
experience needed and understanding of the contracting process can prevent this approach 
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from ever reaching full potential. The greatest threat to the effectiveness of this approach 
is the failure of the acquisition team to frontload its life cycle management process and 
input it into the original contract. This requires extensive market research on not only price 
but the shelf life of components. If the contract is poorly defined, then this approach will 
be no different from the conventional method being used today. Additionally, since most 
acquisition projects extend beyond the average expectancy of those working within the 
program, it is imperative that justifications and determinations are documented adequately.  
Another threat to the implementation of this approach is that it will result in 
increased contract cost up front. Predicting and requiring the contractor to not only 
providing technical support but also to replace hardware or software at set intervals will 
increase cost when compared to a one-time delivered system. This can prevent the original 
allocation of funding to the POR only on the basis of upfront cost.  
b. Conclusion  
This section presented a divergent approach to the way the DoD currently defines 
a POR. Although this approach cannot assist with the actual acquisition and procurement 
processes, it provides an alternative way of thinking within the realm of programs of 
record. There are no active regulations or laws restricting the use of this approach; 
therefore, immediate implementation is possible. The execution of these should be 
restricted to programs that are more based on commercial technological advancements 
rather than ones that are reserved for legacy systems, such as the Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle or the A-10 Warthog. This approach can not only change the way in which the 
Marine Corps employ current technologies, but incorporate calculated modifications to 
continue adopting the newest and most secure technological advancements into the current 
structure. The increased workload by all members of the acquisition team is frontloaded to 
conduct the market research necessary to forecast the increments and capabilities for future 
modifications; in addition to the increased dollar amount at the conception of a program. 
However, the benefits of the increased security while mitigating risk, balanced with a more 
technologically advanced system, may justify the added workload and cost upfront. This 
should not be seen as a replacement to the current processes for acquisitions, but an 
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additional capability that can be leveraged to keep the DoD programs current with the 
commercial sector.  
C. PLATFORMS 
As mentioned in Chapter III, none of the members of the research team which 
conducted this report has adequate knowledge to make a recommendation for the adoption 
of an all-inclusive enterprise system on which the Marine Corps could conduct all 
procurement activities. Instead, the research team focused their efforts on the only non-
system based platform by offering a recommendation for the expansion of the GCPC 
program.  
The uses of the GCPC program are delegated down to the lowest level while still 
maintaining the necessary accountability levels. Within a single Marine battalion, typically 
the commanding officer (CO) assigns the supply officer to be the certifying officer and 
approving official, while the supply officer selects one, or more, junior Marine(s) to be the 
card holders. This gives flexibility to the battalion CO to purchase items that are not 
procurable through GCSS-MC or existing contractual agreements. For the purchase of 
goods, the cardholder is limited to the micro-purchase threshold. Although the limit for 
GCPC purchases has been steadily increasing over the past few years, the low dollar 
amount creates rigidity for larger purchases, especially when preparing for, or conducting 
operations abroad. For MAGTF deployments, a force at a Marine Expeditionary Unit level, 
the smallest of the three MAGTFs, or the Special Purpose MAGTF, one which can 
fluctuate in size, will have a KO on their manning documents. This allotment grants the 
MAGTF commander flexibility to make purchases usually above the micro-purchase 
threshold. The KO also brings greater flexibility not only to the MAGTF holistically but to 
the GCPC program as well. 
According to the GCPC program manual, which resides in the Naval Supply 
Systems Instruction 4200.99, “OCONUS [card-holders] with appropriate delegations of 
contracting authority, may use the purchase card, not to exceed $25,000 for procurements.” 
(Department of the Navy [Navy], 2012b, p. 1–2). This policy does include purchases that 
would require regular contracting support if they were made in a CONUS environment, 
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but due to the nature of being overseas, additional authorities are granted to the cardholders 
and contracting personnel. This policy is not being utilized in widespread fashion across 
the MEF even though it has the potential for deploying MAGTF commanders with all 
available resources, thus increasing the lethality of their influence. Furthermore, 
contingency contracting operations allow the purchase card to be used up to the SAT 
(Navy, 2012b, p. 1–21). 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter of this report, the research team provided alternatives to COA 1, 
Status Quo, on the three pillars of people, processes, and platforms. Within the first two 
pillars, people and processes, the report provided a brief introduction followed by an in-
depth SWOT analysis for each one. Platforms were discussed by providing information on 
policies that which are authorized; however, not in common use.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report, until this point, has discussed optimization through three pillars, and 
why the optimization of the acquisition field within the Marine Corps is needed. Chapter I 
introduced the idea of the importance of innovation within the DoD, and the need for 
acquisition reform. Chapter II analyzed previous theses and scholarly works written 
pertaining to contracting, acquisition, and the importance of reform therein. Chapter III 
discussed the status quo, COA 1, in the respective pillars of people, processes, and 
platforms through a SWOT analysis. Chapter IV presented alternatives based on the 
analysis conducted in Chapter III, through the three pillars, for the optimization of the 
Marine Corps OCS.  
In the final chapter of this report, we will state our recommendations to optimize 
acquisitions in the Marine Corps by recognizing contracting as a function of acquisitions 
and the role it has to play in increasing the lethality of the warfighter. Based on the analysis 
conducted using the SWOT approach in Chapters III and IV, the recommendations listed 
in this chapter are the authors’ conclusions to expand operational capacity, proficiency 
within the contracting field, as well as maximizing the ROI of the commissioned 
contracting force. Although they can be implemented independently, the recommendations 
are not mutually exclusive, as they can be implemented together. Moreover, it is the 
opinion of the authors that these recommendations are complementary in nature, and 
should be implemented concurrently. Finally, this chapter will close with suggested 
research opportunities for further analysis as well as a report conclusion. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In line with the report’s methodology, the recommendations made in this chapter 
are broken down by each of the three pillars of people, processes, and platforms. The final 
part of this section will associate each research question presented in the introduction of 




This section will answer the following research question as identified in Chapter I, 
as well as offer recommendations that pertain to retaining, training, and professionalizing 
the officer corps:  
a. Recommendation 1: Commissioned Contracting Officer Eligibility Pool 
Expansion 
The screening for commissioned KOs should not be limited to the supply 
community, but include the logistics community as well. With the background in supply 
chain management, supply and logistics officers both have the technical skills, and 
experience, to understand the warfighter’s requirement and can quickly transform that 
requirement into a tangible acquisition. This expansion of the KO candidate pool will 
increase competition to obtain a seat at NPS, thus increasing the overall quality of the 
commissioned KO. The Marine Corps previously allowed all MOSs to apply to become a 
KO, and many of these officers had successful KO tours. We, however, would limit the 
pool to only allow supply and logistics officer due to the steeper learning curve experienced 
by other MOSs.  
b. Recommendation 2: Professionalism of Commissioned Contracting 
Officers 
Contracting is an acquisition profession, and therefore, KOs should be aligned 
under acquisitions. As stated in Chapter II, and reiterated in Chapter IV, Title 10 of United 
States Code, §1721 deliberately identifies that contracting is one of the many positions 
which falls under acquisitions, and therefore the Marine Corps talent management model 
should follow suit. The realignment of the contracting field from the current monitor to the 
acquisitions monitor would also introduce a necessary advocate to the contracting 
profession who is above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Due to their operational 
capabilities, acquisition and contracting career fields are inherently different from the 
combat service support career fields. The intricacies of not only fiscal law but FAR-based 
acquisition is an added level which separates contracting from supply activities.  
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Professionalizing the contracting service under acquisitions would also create a 
viable career path for KOs who apply to become acquisition officers. In addition to having 
the background in acquisition, program management classes overlap with contracting 
classes at NPS, to include a majority of the MBA core classes. Lastly, promotion boards 
have a precept for acquisition officers, which assists in alleviating the need for command 
equivalent billets during the utilization tours. KOs would be afforded the same opportunity 
to continue to be promoted within the contracting or acquisition fields.  
c. Recommendation 3: Selection of COA 2, Permanent Transfer
COA 2, permanent transfer, offers the most significant increase in depth of 
capabilities while requiring the least amount of change to the current structures. The 
permanent transfer would allow the retention of the acquired contracting skills and 
knowledge to compound overtime, making a more robust KO, and someone who can 
adequately advise MAGTF commanders on the best acquisition methods in an OCS role. 
This would also introduce a viable path to retain the best officers and have them apply for 
the 8059 Marine acquisition officer MOS. Due to the similar necessary NPS classes, KOs 
would have not only the education requirement covered, but also the experience in how to 
meet the goals and objectives of cost, schedule, and performance. Additionally, this COA 
does not require significant changes to how the current KOs are chosen now; it would only 
include the pool of 0402 logistics officers into the field of potential candidates. COA 2 is 
the recommended  
(1) COA 1, Status Quo, Not Selected Due to Inefficiencies 
Even though COA 1 may fulfill current operational needs, it does not, and cannot 
keep up with the increased reliance on contracting in future battles. The current selection 
and retention process for commissioned KOs forces a cyclic rotation back to their original 
MOS for promotion and advancement. This career progression model loses valuable 
knowledge gained by KOs through their NPS education, and primary payback tour 
experience. Upon secondary or tertiary utilization tours, the KO cannot be expected to 
provide the best insight and apply intuition in terms of OCS planning due to the time 
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between KO tours. This break of follow-on tours fails to capitalize on the ROI the Marine 
Corps vested into their contracting professionals.  
(2) Impracticalities Associated with COAs 3 and 4 
COA 3, 3006 OCS officer as a PMOS, loses the invaluable distinction between 
uniformed KOs and civilian contracting officers by removing the FMF primary tour. This 
unnecessary separation between KOs and the rest of the Marine Corps would force the 
Marine Corps to abandon the axiom of every Marine is a rifleman. Additionally, COA 3 is 
most similar to the Air Force model concerning specializing each MOS. This is 
unnecessary due to the size of the CCF and inherent differences in contracting 
requirements. COA 4, restricted officers track, diverges so far from COA 1, status quo, as 
to require too much organizational change to implement. Furthermore, it does not offer the 
Marine Corps the opportunity to augment, enhance, or further develop its capacity to do 
more than only expeditionary contracting or OTAs.  
d. Recommendation 4: Other Transactional Authority Advocate 
Within each RCO, a commissioned KO will be assigned to be the OTA advocate to 
track and provide guidance for OTA submissions. This will provide the necessary link 
between the tactical level and MARCORSYSCOM, I&L, and DIU. This additional billet 
will assist in giving greater flexibility to the MAGTF commanders by allowing CONUS 
based units the ability to see if their idea would be a good fit for the streamlined acquisition 
OTA pipeline. This OTA advocate would receive training from DAU, DIU, or I&L and be 
able to understand the differences between FAR contracts and OTA agreements and help 
explain the differences between the two to the regional commanders.  
e. Recommendation 5: Contracting Liaison Officer 
Any contracting office in the Marine Corps that has uniformed KOs has an 
opportunity to optimize its network management and improve its support and relationship 
to the customer. The distinction between civilian and uniformed KOs is the FMF 
experience which enables them to understand and communicate more effectively with 
uniformed customers. Every Marine officer goes to The Basic School, and every enlisted 
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Marine goes to Marine Combat Training, both of which support the expression by General 
A. Gray “Every Marine is, first and foremost, a rifleman. All other conditions are 
secondary.” (Department of the Navy, 2012a, p. 74). The Marine Corps civilian contractors 
are an invaluable asset, but they do not always have the ability to understand the 
requirements user’s needs. Uniformed KOs should be used as a liaison officer (LNO) to 
bridge the gap in communication and build a stronger supporting-supported relationship. 
This does not have to be a billet title but should be seen as a collateral duty. Uniformed 
KOs should plan and coordinate to meet with supply officers and provide an informational 
and educational meeting. The informational meeting should clear up any confusion about 
what services contracting provides, how to receive the best support, and exchange 
information for future questions.  
2. Processes 
This section will answer the following research question as identified in Chapter I, 
as well as offer recommendations that pertain to processes:  
a. Recommendation 6: Other Transactional Authorities Expansion 
OTAs offer a level of flexibility that cannot be duplicated by traditional FAR 
contracts, and therefore, should be integrated into more activities within the Marine Corps. 
This would be an augmentation to traditional FAR contracts, and MAGTF planning will 
gain the ability to leverage both in their challenge to stay ahead of our adversaries. 
Additionally, OTAs can be utilized not only in large acquisitions but also at a more tactical 
level as well. Tangible ideas that originate from the Marine innovation challenges can be 
tested through a less expensive OTA process to conduct official research and development 
or create a working prototype. This tactical aspect of OTAs works best with used 
concurrently with recommendation 4. Finally, all of the entities who are currently 
experimenting or using OTAs need to create a common repository for lessons learned that 
would reduce the amount of overlap, and rework, within the Marine Corps.  
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b. Recommendation 7: Command Equivalency for Contracting Billets 
The Marine Corps must establish command opportunities to be able to retain top 
performers within the OCS community. The Marine Corps already has the structure and 
billets available, such as RCO and ECP units, but the adjustment is an administrative to re-
designate them as a command equivalent billet, similarly to recruiting command positions. 
This will allow Lieutenant Colonels to have the same competitive advantage when going 
up for a Colonel promotion board. The ECP and RCO are similar sizes to the Army 
commander positions, with the roughly the same amount of personnel under their 
command. This process will help retain the best officers within the CCF while modernizing 
and optimizing the OSC community holistically.  
c. Recommendation 8: Redefining of Programs of Record 
Critical thinking encourages the search and identification of divergent ways of 
doing things. This recommendation provides an alternate way of acquiring capabilities 
which rely on equipment that has a technological shelf life. The current approach to a 
program of record associates the program to a physical asset that will be obtained. This 
recommendation exploits the vagueness of the program of record definition to suggest 
pursuing contracts heavy in commercial technology as concepts, rather than a fully defined 
physical delivery. This approach does not and should not be used for all programs of record. 
This approach is optimal for programs such as a computer network where many 
components are commercial and have a technological shelf life.  
3. Platforms 
This section will answer the following research question as identified in Chapter I, 
as well as offer recommendations that pertain to platforms utilized in the Marine Corps:  
a. Recommendation 9: Expansion of Government Commercial Purchase 
Card Utilization  
The expansion to the GCPC program would grant MAGTF commanders greater 
flexibility to purchase commercial goods and services in a deployed environment. 
Although the power to grant usage of the GCPC up to the $25,000 limit requires a 
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contracting officer to authorize the purchases, uniformed contracting officers are present 
during deployments to assist in the process. This recommendation requires zero changes to 
the current strategy or manpower, as it is already allowed as identified in Chapter IV. What 
is necessary is a change of mindset to give MAGTF commanders the most amount of 
flexibility to enhance their lethality.  
4. Revisiting the Research Questions 
This section ties each recommendation to an answer for the research questions 
presented in the introduction.  
a. Q1. Is the current Marine Corps Contracting Force structured to 
holistically support not only today’s needs, but prepare the warfighter to 
face future potential conflicts? 
In the MOC General Neller recognized the slew of issues before the Marine Corps 
as it prepares for the challenges of the future operating environment. Many of those 
challenges identified are ones which contracting can provide viable answers for. However, 
before contracting can provide the optimal solution, the Marine Corps will need to think 
critically about making changes to the current contracting force structure. 
Recommendations 2 recognizes that contracting needs to be directly aligned under 
acquisitions rather than under logistics. Recommendations 4 provides a method by which 
the Marine Corps can empower tactical commanders to source their Marines with the assets 
they need when they need it. Recommendation 4 also enables a consolidation of efforts 
when it comes to the use of OTAs across the Marine Corps. The combination of these 
recommendations would enable the Marine Corps to leverage the best that contracting has 
to offer in meeting the challenges that lay before it.  
b. Q2. Is there a better method to recruit, employ, and utilize the 
Contingency Contracting Force, thus improving the operational value as 
a resource to the MLG/ MEF/ USMC?  
Beyond the challenges of the battlefield, the MOC also recognized the need for the 
recruitment, development, and retention of highly qualified Marines. Recommendation 1 
is in response to the recognition that the current system is not optimized to recruit the most 
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highly qualified Marines to be KOs. Similarly, recommendation 3 provides an answer to 
how the Marine Corps could not only recruit KOs more effectively, but also enables for 
the increased depth of contracting actions through which KOs can support commanders at 
every level. Recommendation 5 is a method by which the Marine Corps can improve the 
operational value of KOs everywhere by leveraging networks to not only inform and 
educate, but to also assist Marines with getting what they need. While contracting is not a 
function of supply, all supply Marines and KOs should have a network through which, 
together, they can provide effective and efficient support to the warfighter.  
c. Q3. Would the professionalization of the contracting force enhance the 
lethal capabilities of the Marine Corps?  
Recommendations 2 and 3 recognize how the current approach to managing 
commissioned KOs keeps the Marine Corps from leveraging all available means to 
facilitate its improved lethality. Contracting is a highly technical field that is consistently 
changing and evolving. Additionally, contracting is the only defense acquisition workforce 
with additional requirements leveraged upon it by DODI 5000.66. Professionalization of 
the 3006 OCS officer field with potential enables the development of compound 
knowledge development by not requiring officers to transition back and forth between two 
different MOS. Furthermore, changes in how the Marine Corps recruits KOs and the 
realignment and expansion of the locations where uniformed KOs are assigned will result 
in an increased depth of contracting capabilities. The combinations of these 
recommendations would increase the effectiveness and efficiency with which acquisition 
and contracting activities support the needs of the warfighter.  
d. Q4. Can the Marine Corps benefit from integrating a more diverse 
approach to contracting?  
Recommendations 6, 8, 9 discuss how a more diverse approach can enhance the 
capabilities of the Marine Corps contracting profession. When discussing acquisitions, the 
Marine Corps should not put artificial limitation and restrictions on methods which can 
benefit the Marine Corps. The expansion of OTAs discussed in recommendation 6 does 
not reduce the capabilities of contracting, it adds flexibility and provides another tool a 
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MAGTF commander can use to accomplish their mission. Recommendation 8 introduces 
a different mindset for how the Marine Corps defines POR, and keeps with the rhetoric of 
the SecDef’s national defense strategy. Recommendation 9 is already approved for use 
according to Naval Supply Systems Instruction 4200.99, and is yet another tool MAGTF 
commanders can use to enhance their flexibility overseas.  
B. CALL FOR ACTION 
With the information in this thesis, we are recommending that agencies such as 
MMOA as well as I&L take these recommendations for further research, implementation, 
or discussion at higher levels. These agencies are the ones who genuinely effect long-term 
change within the contracting professions, and can take the necessary actions to allow the 
recommendations made in this chapter to take hold correctly.  
 
C. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH  
This report was originally looking for ideal strategies that the Marine Corps can 
holistically enact to optimize contracting strategy. While this report was the first to look at 
each pillar of people, processes, and platforms entirely; additional areas of research were 
uncovered that could not be researched due to scope or time requirements. Primarily, taking 
this report and assigning costs to each alternative offered and conducting a cost benefit 
analysis is an area of possible further research. Furthermore, looking into the feasibility of 
enhancing COA 4, restricted officers track, by assigning costs to dollars saved is another 
area of potential research. Finally, looking into the applicability of combining the platforms 
and have them communicate with each other through web-based applications is the third 
area of potential research.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The recommendations made in this chapter are the authors’ professional 
assessments on how Marine Corps contracting can be optimized in order to stay ahead of 
the United States’ adversaries. The increase of developing technology, paired with a 
changing environment surrounding acquisition methods, is forcing the Marine Corps to 
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look closely at their practices and methods to make improvements. This report’s objective 
was to identify ways to enhance the Marine Corps’ operating success at levels that have 
not been tested, as a holistic analysis had not been done since the early 2000s. The 
concurrent implementation of the recommendations identified in Chapter V will ensure 
that the Marine Corps remains steadfast in their commitment to service of the United States, 
and keeping with the mindsets of the SecDef and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  
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